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INVESTMENT ADVISORY REGULATORY
MUDDY WATERS: REGISTRATION AND
CONTROL ISSUES ARE CONFUSED
WITH ISSUES OF DISCLOSURE
AND ANTI-FRAUD
SusAN ROGERS FINNERAN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Persons engaged in providing investment advice must register as investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, as amended, (the "Advisers Act")' or be subject to the supervision and control of a registered investment advisor ("RIA"). 2
Registration or control effects the statutory purposes and, thus,
should also provide the requisite statutory protection for investors. Notwithstanding the foregoing shibboleth' and its logic, as
well as, the legislatively-recognized distinction between brokerdealers 4 and investment advisers, 5 the staff of the Securities and
Professor at New England School of Law, Boston, MA. The author would
like to extend her sincerest appreciation for all of the hard work and generous
donation of time given to her in the writing of this article by Bernard Fealing.
The author would also like to thank Carolyn Rubin for the many hours of
discussion related to this area of law and to David Berg for his contribution
related to supervision and control responsibilities.
1. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (the
"Advisors Act").
2. See infra text at 111-14.
3. "The Commission and its staff have on numerous occasions confirmed the
view that 'a person associated with an investment adviser' as that term is defined
in Section 202(a)(17)[of the Advisers Act], will not be required to be separately
registered as an investment adviser with respect to the activities undertaken on
behalf of the adviser in the person's capacity as an associated person." Ropes &
Gray, 1995 SEC No-Act LEXIS 728 at 24 (Sept. 26, 1995).
4. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (the
"1934 Act" or "Exchange Act") with respect to broker-dealers and their associated
persons. Although the terms "broker" and "dealer" are defined separately in the
1934 Act, in judicial and administrative analysis, both definitions are discussed
and the person referred to is a "broker-dealer". SEC v. Schmidt, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,202 (1971). In some cases, however, the two definitions are
distinguished and the person is referred to only as a broker or dealer. Castelman
& Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,260 (1975); Thomas R.
*
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Exchange Commission (the "SEC" or "Commission")6 has imposed
supplementary oversight by requiring broker-dealer supervision
and control,' and encouraging self-regulatory organizations
Vorbeck, SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 SEC No-Act, LEXIS 1823 (Feb. 22, 1974).
See infra text at 114 for detailed definition of each term "broker" and "dealer".
5. See infra text at 118-20 for detailed definition of investment adviser.
6. The SEC is the statutorily-created and principal regulator of securities
professionals, both broker-dealers and investment advisors.
7. See infra note 10 regarding supervision and control duties imposed on
member broker-dealers of the NASD (as hereinafter defined). 'The NASD
requires that a registered representative who participates in a 'private securities
transaction', i.e., a transaction outside the regular course or scope of the person's
employment with a broker-dealer, must notify the broker-dealer in writing prior
to participating in the transaction. The notification must describe the person's
role and whether the person is receiving selling compensation in connection with
the transaction (e.g., commissions, finder's fees, rights or expense
reimbursements)." In re Eugene T. Ichinose, Jr., Exchange Act Release No.
17381, 1980 SEC LEXIS 105 (Dec. 16, 1980).
For transactions involving the receipt of selling compensation, the brokerdealer must then notify the representative as to whether it approves or
disapproves of the representative's participation in the transaction. If the
broker-dealer approves of such participation, the transaction must be recorded
on the broker-dealer's books and supervised as if it were executed on the brokerdealer's behalf. The record of the transaction would typically include the
employee's name, the security involved, amount and source of compensation and
details of the transaction. If the broker-dealer disapproves, the representative
may not directly or indirectly participate in the transaction. However, the
requirements do not apply to personal transactions in investment company and
variable annuity securities, transactions among immediate family members
where no selling compensation is received, or transactions subject to Article II,
Section 28.
The NASD generally prohibits a person associated with an NASD member
organization in any registered capacity from being employed by or accepting
compensation from any other person as a result of ahy business activity outside
the scope of the person's relationship with the person's employer firm, unless
written notice has been provided to the member. See Article II, Section 43 of the
NASD Rules of Fair Practice.
However, Section 43 does not apply to passive investments or to activities
subject to Section 40 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, discussed above.
Lemke, Thomas and Lins, Gerald, Regulation of Investment Advisors (New
York) Clark Boardman Callahan at 2-63 - 2-64.
Supervision is an essential function of the broker-dealer according the SEC
which has "made it clear that it is critical for investor protection that a broker
establish and enforce effective procedures to supervises its employees." Donald T.
Sheldon, 52 SEC Docket 3826, 3855 (1992). See also In the Matter of Anthony J.
Amato, Exchange Act Release No. 10265, 1873 SEC LEXIS 2769 at *6-8 (June
29, 1973).
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5 such as the National Association of Securities Dealers,
("SROT)

Article III of NASD Rules of Fair Practice Section 40 defines "private
securities transaction" as any securities transaction outside the regular course or
scope of an associated persons employment with a member. Section 40(3)(1) of
the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. This term applies to so-called "selling away"
type transactions where a registered representative sells an investment product
not authorized by his broker-dealer or without the knowledge of his brokerdealer. See, e.g., In the Matter of Frank W. Leonesio, SEC No - Action Letter;
1986 SEC LEXIS 1009 (Aug. 11, 1986) (where Leonesio sold securities without
his employing broker-dealer's knowledge and did not register as a broker-dealer
himself); In the Matter of Klaus Langheinrich, Exchange Act Release No. 34107,
1994 SEC LEXIS 1631 (May 25, 1994); In the Matter of Consolidated Investment
Services, Inc., Norman P. Rounds, James L. Fainter, SEC No-Action Letter 1994
SEC LEXIS 4045 (December 12, 1994). But see In the Matter of William D.
George, III, Exchange Act Release No. 17136, 1980 SEC LEXIS 762 (Sept. 8,
1980) (where term "private securities transaction" was also applied to
indemnification agreement because it was inextricably linked to a securities
transaction or places the trade through another broker-dealer). See, e.g., In the
Matter of Paulson Investment Co., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 19603, 1983
SEC LEXIS 2190 (Mar. 16, 1983); In the Matter of Richard W. Perkins,
Exchange Act Release No. 19345, 1982 SEC LEXIS 120 (Dec. 16, 1982).
8. Section 3(aX26) of the 1934 Act defines "self-regulatory organization" as
"any national securities exchange, registered securities association, or registered
clearing agency. . . " 15A U.S.C. § 78. In 1938, Section 15A was added to the
1934 Act by the Maloney Act, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938). The
NASD was established primarily to govern trading in the over-the-counter (nonexchange) markets. Its authority arises under 15A of the 1934 Act. The NASD
must register with the SEC and maintain rules "to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices and to promote just and equitable principles of
trade in transactions in the OTC market." Sirianni v. United States Securities
and Exchange Commission, 677 F.2d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1982).
Under Section 15A(a), "an association of broker-dealers must register as a
national securities association pursuant to Section 15(b) by filing with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC" or the "Commission") an
application for registration in such form as the SEC, by rule, may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
15 U.S.C. § 780-3(bX6) (1976) (§ 15A(b)(6) of the 1934 Act) (permits a national
securities association to register with the SEC if it has adopted rules designed to
prevent stock fraud and manipulation, promote just and equitable principles of
trade, and protect investors and the public interest). The New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), the Philadelphia Stock
Exchange (PHLYX), Boston Stock Exchange (BSE) are also self-regulatory
agencies acknowledged upon the enactment of the 1934 Act. In 1934, when
Congress created the SEC, stock exchanges, as private associations, had been
regulating their members for up to 140 years. Rather than displace this system
of "self-regulation", Congress required every "national securities exchange" to
register with the SEC. Congress realized that the SEC lacked the expertise and
capabilities to oversee every aspect of the securities markets; therefore, Congress
created SROs under § 19 of the 1934 Act. SROs add to the protection of investors
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997
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Inc. (the "NASD")9 to assert jurisdiction (albeit indirectly), over
certain investment advisory activities!1 °
through supervision and discipline of member broker-dealers and persons
associated with such broker-dealers. Under the 1934 Act, an exchange cannot be
registered unless the SEC determines that its rules are designed to "prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable
principles of trade, and to provide for appropriate discipline of its members for
any violations of its own rules or the securities laws."
9. The focus of this article when referencing SROs in this context is on the
NASD. There are other self-regulatory organizations, such as the New York
Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange and various regional stock
exchanges. The NASD is composed of broker-dealer firms which sell securities in
the over-the-counter market. The principal (as opposed to regional) exchange
market consists of the New York Stock Exchange and the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"), but also authorized the creation
of self-regulatory organizations for the securities exchange. Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 6, 48 Stat. 881, 895-896, reprinted in
15 U.S.C. sec. 78(e), (f)(1988). See also Report of Special Study of Securities
Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Part 4, H Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 501 (April 8, 1963). No similar self-regulatory authority was
established originally in 1934 for the OTC market. Only the SEC was charged
with regulatory oversight of this market.
10. Registered investment advisers who are also registered representatives of
NASD member broker-dealers are subject to indirect SRO regulation pursuant to
certain rule-making and policy promulgations, such as Article III of the NASD
Rules of Fair Practice, Section 40. See, eg., NASD Notice to Members 94-44.
Article III Section 40 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice provides that any
person associated with a member who participates in a private securities
transaction must, prior to participating in the transaction, provide written notice
to the member broker-dealer with which he or she is associated. Section 40
provides as follows:
(a) Applicability - No person associated with a member shall
participate in any manner in a private securities transaction except
in accordance with the requirements of this section.
(b) Written Notice - Prior to participating in any private securities
transaction, an associated person shall provide written notice to the
member with which he is associated describing in detail the
proposed transaction and the persons proposed role therein and
stating whether he has received or may receive selling compensation
in connection with the transaction; provided however that, in the
case of a series of related transactions in which no selling
compensation has been or will be received, an associated person may
provide a single written notice.
(c) Transactionsfor Compensation(1) In the case of a transaction in which an associated person has
received or may receive selling compensation, a member which
has received notice pursuant to Subsection (b) shall advise the
associated person in writing stating whether the member:
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(A) approves the person's participation in the proposed
transaction; or
(B) disapproves the person's participation in the proposed
transaction.
(2) If the member approves a person's participation in a transaction
pursuant to Subsection (c)(1), the transaction shall be recorded
on the books and records of the member and the member shall
supervise the person's participation in the transaction as if the
transaction were executed on behalf of the member.
(3) If the member disapproves a person's participation pursuant to
Subsection (c)(1), the person shall not participate in the
transaction in any manner, directly or indirectly.
(d) TransactionsNot For Compensation - In the case of a transaction or
a series of related transactions in which an associated person has
not and will not receive any selling compensation, a member which
has received notice pursuant to Subsection (b) shall provide the
associated person prompt written acknowledgment of said notice
and may, at its discretion, require the person to adhere to specified
conditions in connection with his participation in the transaction.
The required notice under NASD Section 40 must describe the transaction,
the associated person's role, and whether the associated person has received or
may receive selling compensation. The member must respond to the notice in
writing indicating whether it approves or disapproves the proposed transaction.
Where the registered person has received or may receive selling compensation,
the member approving this transaction must record the transaction in its books
and records and must supervise the registered persons participation in the
transaction as if it were such member's own under Section 27 of the NASD Rules
of Fair Practice. Even if the outside business activity of the registered
representative is not brokerage, but investment advisory activities, failure to
comply with Rule 40 will expose the parties to sanctions. See, eg., In the Matter
of Richard L. Robinson; Release No. 16597; 1980 SEC LEXIS 2023 (Feb. 21,
1980).
At the very heart of this Rule are the phrases: "private securities
transaction"; "selling compensation"; member approval or disapproval;
"supervise"; "as if the transaction were executed on behalf of the member"; and
"require the person to adhere to specified conditions". These terms, at least
facially, seem inextricably tied to the 1934 Act's definition of broker-dealer
"effecting securities transactions". Indeed, within Section 40's definition of
"private securities transaction", the term "securities transaction" is used to
define the type of activity considered "outside the regular course or scope" of the
registered representatives activities which is the subject of this Section. But
what appears is not always so. Indeed, the application of Section 40 extends well
beyond securities transactions as envisioned in the 1934 Act. It now reaches
investment advisory activities of registered representatives conducted
independently of the member broker-dealer. This section applies to investment
advisory activities conducted by a duly registered person (i.e., registered
representative and RIA) that result in the purchase or sale of securities.
Regulation of Investment Advisers at 2-63. To understand how this expansion is
justified requires focusing on how the term "private securities transaction" has
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been stretched by emphasis on the phrase "outside the regular course or scope of
business". See, e.g., In the Matter of Gordon Wesley Sodorff, Jr., Exchange Act
Release No. 31134; 1992 SEC LEXIS 2190 (Sept. 2, 1992).
For example, an indemnification agreement executed by a registered
representative in connection with the pledge of securities of a customer to a bank
as collateral for a loan constituted a private security transaction because the
indemnity agreement was "inextricably linked to the pledge of stock". In the
Matter of William D. George, III, Exchange Act Release No. 17136; 1980 SEC
LEXIS 762 at 5 (September 8, 1980). Similarly, a referral fee arrangement
entered into between a registered representative and someone other than his
employing broker-dealer was held to be subject to Section 40. In the Matter of
Allen S. Kiosowski, Exchange Act Release No. 25467, 1988 SEC LEXIS 507 (Mar.
15, 1988) (where SEC affirmed NASD sanctions against associated person who
referred firm's customers to syndicator in exchange for finder's fees). In the
Matter of Philip S. Sirianni, Exchange Act Release No. 17077, 1980 SEC LEXIS
878 at 6 (Aug. 20, 1980).
Section 40 is not limited to outside brokerage activities as indicated, indeed,
a registered representative's argument that he had not violated Section 40
because he had acted as an investment adviser was of no avail. In the Matter of
Richard L. Robinson, Exchange Act Release No. 16597, 1980 SEC LEXIS 2023
(Feb. 21, 1980).
The language to the introduction of the NASD's Interpretation to Section 40
provides that the involvement of registered representatives in private securities
transactions "may raise serious questions regarding their need to register as
broker dealers and/or investment advisers under state and federal securities
laws". 1980 SEC LEXIS 2023 at 3. The SEC also rejected Robinson's assertion
that this language excused his activities since he was a registered investment
adviser, in addition to being a registered representatives. The SEC did not see
how this warning could be construed as authorizing Robinson to violate the clear
terms of the NASD's interpretation because he was registered as an investment
adviser. I do.
Two provisions both referring to the same matter should be read
consistently, not inconsistently, with one another. If failure to comply with
Section 40 can result in one improperly engaged as an unregistered brokerdealer, why does not submission, by registration with the SEC, to the full
panoply of the applicable federal securities law solve the problem? Has not
registration achieved the purported goal of protecting investors? Has not the
integrity of the federal securities laws been preserved? Has not the
Congressionally mandated statutory level of regulation over the disparate
market functions of broker-dealer and investment adviser been achieved?
Contrary to the SEC contention in the Robinson matter, the public is not
"deprived of protection which it is entitled to expect". In the matter of Anthony J.
Amato, Exchange Act Release No. 10265, 1973 SEC LEXIS 2769 at 7 (June 29,
1973); In the Matter of Richard L. Robinson, Exchange Act Release No. 16597,
1980 SEC LEXIS 2023 at 4 (Feb. 21, 1980). The public is entitled to expect only
that which Congress has provided: in the 1934 Act with respect to brokerage
activities; and the Advisers Act with respect to investment advisory activities.
Indeed, by expanding, ex cathedra, the statutorily-mandated expectations the
SEC has created regulatory unevenness and possibly inconsistently in
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"protections" afforded to customers of a registered representative/RIA and
customers of an RIA, separate and distinction from his registered representative.
The National Business Conduct Committee (NBCC) of the NASD concluded
that Section 40 applied to all investment advisory "activities of individuals who
are registered both as representatives of an NASD member firm and with the
SEC as a Registered Investment Adviser ("duly registered persons" or "RR/RIA")
and who conduct their investment advisory activities 'away from' their NASD
member employer." 1994 NASD LEXIS 39, at 2; NASD Notice to Members 94-44
(May 15, 1994). The NBCC also determined that the receipt of compensation as a
result of investment advisory activities constituted the receipt of selling
compensation as defined in Section 40. The Board focused primarily upon the
duly registered persons participation in the execution of the transactionmeaning participation that goes beyond mere recommendation. Section 40,
therefore, applies to any transaction in which the duly registered person
participates in the execution of the trade. An example would be where the duly
registered person enters an order on behalf of the customer for particular
securities either with a brokerage firm other than the member they are
registered with, directly with a mutual fund, or with any other entity, including
another adviser, and receive any compensation for the overall advisory services.
Of particular note is the reference in this NASD Notice 94-44 to the basis
upon which the NASD states this matter of a dually registered RR/RIA; namely,
"... as a result of a number of requests for interpretations relating to programs
under which registered representatives directed securities transactions for their
investment advisory clients to a broker-dealer other than the firm with which
they are registered" (emphasis added). Id. This concern seems directed more at
"selling away" type transactions than supervision and control issues.
An RIA under the Advisers Act is required to seek best execution for its
clients. The NASD also reported in NASD Notice to Members 94-44 that the
NBCC "... focused primarily upon RR/RIA's participation in the execution of the
transaction-meaning participation that goes beyond mere recommendations."
(emphasis added). Id. at 4-5. Under the Advisers Act, an RIA has the obligation,
however, to seek best execution which may not always be possible with the
registered representatives employing broker-dealer. Participation in investment
advisory activities triggering Section 40 include entering an order for securities
with: a brokerage firm (other than the registered representatives employing
broker-dealer); a mutual fund; another investment adviser or other entity and
receiving compensation for the overall advisory services. Excluded from Section
40, however, are arrangements . . . "which the account is 'handed off to
unaffiliated third-party advisors that make all investment decisions..." Id.
Other SROs such as NYSE also exert authority over outside business
activities such as NYSE Rule 346 (b) and (3) and Supplementary Material .10;
American Stock Exchange Rule 342(a) and (b) and Commentary .20. The focus of
this article will be on the NASD. Persons designated as representatives for the
purposes of the NASD include "assistant officers other than principals, who are
engaged in the investment banking or securities business for the member
including the functions of supervision, solicitation or conduct of business in
securities or who are engaged in the training of persons associated with a
member for any of these functions." Membership, registration and qualifications
requirements, '103 1(b)(1996).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997
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Turning the NASD and its member broker-dealers into an
investment advisory SRO to supplement SEC oversight (no matter how well-intended) is legislatively questionable," and also
results in uneven and non-uniform oversight of the investment
advisory business depending upon whether or not the investment
advisory function: (1) is completely segregated from any association with a broker-dealer;' 2 (2) is conducted by a registered representative of the broker-dealer (ARR) who is also registered as an
investment adviser, whether individually or through a separately
incorporated entity owned by the RR; 13 (3) is conducted by a separately incorporated entity who engages the services of a natural
person who is also an RR, or (4) is conducted by the brokerdealer. 14 Only some, not all, of these enumerated situations trigger supplementary broker-dealer supervision and control over
investment advisory activities. This supplementary oversight is
imposed by the SEC staff with SRO assistance, but not pursuant
to Advisers Act mandate. On what basis can 1934 registered entities, SRO or broker-dealer, assert, with competence and authority,
supervision and control over activities subject to the Advisers
Act?' 5 Registration by a broker-dealer does not obviate registra11. Although presently there is no SRO established under the Advisers Act,
the SEC is desirous of supplementing its oversight of the investment advisory
business with establishment of an SRO, comparable to that extant with respect
to broker dealers, such as the NASD, an SRO established under the 1934 Act.
See Legislation to Amend Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Proposed by
Securities and Exchange Commission; Investment Advisers Act Release No. 491
(Dec. 5, 1975; See also National Detroit Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1975
SEC No-Act LEXIS 121 (Dec 27, 1974). To date, Congress has not acted
favorably upon the creation of an SRO under the Advisers Act.
12. There is no SRO oversight of the investment advisory function in this
instance and hence only investment advisory activities conducted by a dually
registered person trigger additional oversight, directly or indirectly, by a brokerdealer and/or SRO such as the NASD.
13. See difference between Article III, NASD §§ 40, 43.
14. See difference between Article III, NASD §§ 40, 43.
15. "The purpose of the prohibition against effecting transactions for
customers outside the normal procedures and without disclosure to the employer
is twofold: (1) to protect the public by ensuring oversight and supervision of a
registered representative's sales activity; and (2) to protect the employer from
exposure to loss for transactions about which it is unaware." "Outside sales
activities, even if uncompensated, expose investors to possible losses and
employers to possible liability. A securities firm, through which salesmen are
registered for the protection of the public, must protect investors as well as itself
through supervisory measures that impose conditions on a salesman's
employment. To implement and enforce those measures, the firm must be
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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tion under the Advisers Act if that broker-dealer engages in
investment advisory services on anything other than on an incidental basis.16 Any broker-dealer asserting supervision and control over a registered investment adviser or its agents and
associated persons:1 7 is inconsistent with the shibboleth of register or be subject to RIA control; arguably, could jeopardize that
broker-dealer's exclusion from the definition of investment adviser
under the Advisers Act; and, is inconsistent with Advisers Act
Section 208(d)'s prohibition against doing indirectly what one can
not do directly; 18 namely, engage in the advisory business without
registration.
Added to the mix outlined above is the SEC staff insistence in
some, but not all, RIA networking arrangements, on RIA sole control over not only investment advisory activities, but all activities
of the RIA's associated persons. As indicated above, in some broker-dealer/RIA networking arrangements, an RIA may not be able
apprised of an associated person's outside involvement in securities transactions"

(emphasis added). In the Matter of Jay Frederick Keeton, Exchange Act Release
No. 31082; 1992 SEC LEXIS 2002 at 4 (Aug. 24, 1992). See also In the Matter of
William Brian Sorscher, Exchange Act Release No. 33218, 1993 SEC LEXIS
3162 (Nov. 18, 1993); Jay Frederick Keeton, Exchange Rel. No. 31082 (Aug. 24,
1992) 52 SEC Docket 1322; Allen S. Klosowski, 48 SEC. 954, 956 (1988); Anthony
J. Amato, 45 SEC Docket 282, 285 (1973).
16. Section 202(a)(11)(C) excludes from the definition of investment adviser
broker-dealers whose investment advisory activities are merely "incidental".
17. Taken together, NASD Rules of Fair Practice attempt to regulate outside
employment by a registered representative. Indeed, "[tihe NASD generally
prohibits a person associated with an NASD member . .. in any registered
capacity from being employed by or accepting compensation from any other
person as a result of any business activity outside the scope of the person's
relationship with the person's employer firm, unless written notice has been
provided to the member." Regulation of Investment Advisers at 2-64 (referencing
purpose of Article III, Section 43 of NASD Rules of Fair Practice). The goal may
be justified, the means by which the goal is achieved with respect to investment
advisory activities, however, is questionable. Insisting on a registered brokerdealer supervising a registered investment adviser is counter-intuitive and
inconsistent with the congressionally recognized separateness of functions. The
functions of broker- dealer and investment adviser are not only different, the
regulation of each function is subject to a distinct congressionally enacted
statute. How can the NASD and SEC rationally pursue this insistence on
broker-dealer supervision and control over the investment advisory activities of a
separately registered RIA conducted by its registered representative?
18. "It shall be unlawful for any person indirectly, or through or by any other
person, to do any act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do
directly under the provisions of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder."
15 U.S.C. § 208(d).
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to exercise sole control even over investment advisory services
persons since the SEC staff and cooperating SROs, such as, the
NASD, insist on broker-dealer supervision and control over
investment advisory activities of a person dually registered as a
registered representative of a broker-dealer and an RIA (collectively, "RR/RIA"). By contrast in RIA/financial networking
arrangements, the SEC staff has insisted on RIA sole control over
all activities of its associated persons. In these instances, the staff
insistences are inherently contradictory. This is so because I
believe the SEC staff confuses issues of registration and control
with possible conflict of interest issues. This latter concern can be
addressed by disclosure and compliance with the usual conduct
necessary to avoid violating antifraud concerns, 19 not by imposing
supervision and control. The regulatory inconsistency among SEC
staff holdings is apparent. The degrees of RIA control vary. Sole
RIA control is insisted upon in RIA/financial institution networking arrangements; broker-dealer supervision and control over the
advisory activities, however, is insisted upon when performed by
RR/RIA; and RIA control over only investment advisory, as
opposed to all, activities is insisted upon in RIA/non-financial
institution networking arrangements. If sole RIA control were
uniformly insisted upon, perhaps, the prohibition of Section 208(d)
19. In recognition that many registered representatives also act as registered
investment advisers, and the resulting potential for conflicts of interests,
Regulation of Investment Advisers, at 2-62, NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Article
III, Section 1 requires members to "observe high standards of commercial honor

and just and equitable principles of trade." NASD Manual (CCH) 2151, p. 2014 the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice impose standards of conduct "and other
requirements" on the activities of broker-dealers and their registered
representatives. Regulation of Investment Advisers at 2-62. See, e.g., Article III,

Section 28 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice (relating to requirements imposed
when a registered representative opens an account or trades through a brokerdealer other than his/her employing broker-dealer).

Sometimes the

interrelationship between Section 28 and Section 20 of the NASD Rules of Fair
Practice becomes an issue. See, e.g.,In the Matter of Richard W. Perkins;
Exchange Act Release No. 19345; 1982 SEC LEXIS 120 (Dec. 16, 1982). In an
administrative proceeding involving Section 40, the registered representative
asserted that the "purpose of the NASD's interpretation is merely to prevent
customers from being misled as to the employing firms' sponsorship of their
salesmen's transactions." In the Matter of Zester Herbert Hatfield, Exchange
Act Release No. 25488, 1988 SEC LEXIS 551 at 6 (Mar. 18, 1988). The SEC in
response; however, stated that "the NASD's interpretation also serves the very
important functions of protecting employers against investor claims arising from

a salesman's private transactions, and protecting public investors by ensuring
proper supervision of a broker's sales efforts." Id.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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of the Advisers Act could be the rationale. As with the other regulatory shibboleth, register or be supervised and controlled by the
registrant, Section 208(d) is also, however, applied inconsistently.
These inconsistencies evidence muddled thinking, yielding confusion and unnecessary inconsistency in the regulation of investment advisory activities.
II.

DEFINITIONS

A review of basic definition of terms as set forth in the 1934
Act and Advisers Act proves that disparate roles of broker-dealers
and investment advisers are acknowledged. Despite these disparate roles, regulated by different statutes, the same regulatory
shibboleth echoes in each. Each regulatory scheme insists that
anyone engaging in the regulated activity, broker-dealer or investment adviser, as the case may be, register or be subject to the control of the applicable registered entity. This is the regulatory
shibboleth proffered by the SEC, but which the SEC seems to have
difficulty in adhering to whenever the RIA, is also an RR or owned
by an RR; or networks with a financial institution.
1.

Broker, Dealer, Associated Persons and Registered
Representative.

(a) Broker-Dealer.
A broker is one who effects securities transactions on behalf of
another 20 while a dealer is one who buys and sells particular
securities. 21 These terms effecting securities transactions, and
buying and selling securities may be the result of investment advisory activities, but are clearly distinct regulated functions. 22 Only
20. The term "broker" means any person engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank.
(emphasis added). Section 3(a) of the 1934 Act.
21. The term "dealer" means any person engaged in the business of buying
and selling securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but
does not include a bank, or any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for
his own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a
part of a regular business. Section 3(a) of the 1934 Act.
22. A broker-dealer is not required to register as an investment adviser even
if the parent of an advisory subsidiary since the services differ in character and
are not performed by the parent broker-dealer. F. S. Mosley & Company, [19701971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. Par. 78,063 (19._). Moreover, as
discussed earlier and later in the text, a broker-dealer is generally excluded from
the definition of an investment adviser.
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persons so regularly 23 engaged in either effecting or buying and
selling must register with the SEC as a broker-dealer 24 or be an
associated person subject to the supervision and control of the registered broker-dealer. 25
23. This term is to distinguish from a single or isolated transaction.
Massachusetts Financial Services, Inc. v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,
411 F. Supp. 411 (D. Mass. 1976), affd 545 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1976), cert denied
431 U.S. 904; See also Securities and Exchange Commission v. National
Executive Planners, Ltd., 503 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D.N.C. 1980); Loss, Securities
Regulation 1295 (1961); David A. Lipton, A Primer on Broker-Dealer
Registration, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 899 at 911 (1983).
The SEC found that an individual might not be a broker or dealer if,
"on a
single, isolated basis", the individual advertised an interest to engage in
securities transactions for his own account. Joseph McCulley, SEC No-Action
Letter, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,982 at 82111
(Sept. 1, 1972). See also SEC v. Schmidt, SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,202 (1971).
Professor Loss suggests that the phrase "engaged in the business" whether
of buying or selling in the instance of a dealer or effecting securities transactions,
in the instance of a broker connotes a certain regularity of participation in
purchasing and selling activities rather than a few "isolated transactions". II L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1295 (1961).
24. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(a)(1)(1994): "It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer
which is either a person other than a natural person or a natural person not
associated with a broker or dealer which is a person (other than a natural person
. . .) to make use of the mails or any means of instrumentality of interstate
commerce to effect any transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the
purchase or sale of, any security... unless such broker or dealer is registered...
[with the SEC." All broker-dealers are required to register with the SEC except
"such a broker or dealer whose business is exclusively intrastate and who does
not make use of any facility of a national securities exchange. . ." or a broker or
dealer whose securities activities relate only to exempted securities, commercial
paper, bankers' acceptances or commercial bills. Id.
25. Acquisition and sale of stock by a registered representative through
another broker-dealer, without notice to his employing broker-dealer, is clearly
the type of trading activity which rightfully concerns both the SEC and the
NASD. "This is precisely the sort of misconduct that Section 40 is designed to
prevent by ensuring that all trading by an associated person for compensation
will be subject to member firm supervision." In the Matter of Gordon Wesley
Sodorff, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 31134; 1992 SEC LEXIS 2190 at 23 (Sept.
2, 1992). Not only is the securities trade being conducted, if without separate
broker-dealer registration by the registered representative, in violation of the
1934 broker-dealer registration requirements, but also outside the prescriptive
and proscriptive protections afforded under the existing regulatory scheme.
In concurring with the NASD's actions and sanctions against the registered
representative, the SEC noted its prior statements with regards to a salesman's
private securities transactions:
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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(b) Associated Person of Broker-Dealer
Those persons who themselves are not broker-dealers, but
who work for broker-dealers as RRs, as well as, certain other persons are persons associated with a broker-dealer. 26 And, although
the 1934 Act does not require associated persons to register with
"Where employees effect transactions for customers outside of the normal
channels and without disclosure to the employer, the public is deprived of
protection which it is entitled to expect. Moreover, the employer may also thus
be exposed to risks to which it should not be exposed. Thus, such conduct is not
only potentially harmful to public investors, but inconsistent with the obligation
of an employee to serve his employer faithfully." In the Matter of Anthony J.
Amato, Exchange Act Release No. 10265, 1973 SEC LEXIS 2769 (June 29,
1973),; In the Matter of Richard L. Robinson, Exchange Act Release No. 16597,
1980 SEC Lexis 2023 at 5 (Feb.21. 1980). See also In the Matter of Klosowski;
Exchange Act Release No. 25467; 1988 SEC Lexis 507 (Mar. 15, 1988) (which
involved the claim of Prosen, a registered representative of Private Ledger
Financial Services, Inc., that he was not engaged in any private securities
transaction when he referred 17 of his private ledger customers to R.M.
Silverstein, Inc., a wholly owned corporation of Richard Silverstein, another
Private Ledger branch manager who had organized 16 limited partnerships and
engaged in a sales campaign to sell those interests to investors).
The issue surrounding the strong sanction for failing to register as a brokerdealer and concealment by a registered representative of his private securities
activities from his employer stems from "the requirement that non-exempt
broker-dealers register as such is a keystone of the entire system of broker-dealer
regulation. An associated person's 'private' securities transactions deprive the
public of protection that it is entitled to expect when dealing with a registered
broker-dealer, and may expose the firm with which that person is associated to
unwarranted risks." In the Matter of Frank W. Leonesio, Exchange Act Release
No. 23524; 1986 SEC Lexis 1009 at 16 (Aug. 11, 1986).
26. The 1964 Amendments rationalized and refined the concept of "control" by
broker-dealer firms over their sales force by introducing the concept of an
"associated person" of a broker-dealer. "An 'associated person' is defined in
Section 3(a)(18) of the 1934 Act to include three categories of persons: (i) any
partner, officer, director or branch manager of the broker-dealer; (ii) any person
directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under the common control with
such broker-dealer; and (iii) any employee of such broker-dealer." 14 USC
Section 78c(a)(18) (1988). But see, F.S. Mosely & Company, [1970-71 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 78,063 (1971). This term also includes
independent contractors. See Alexander C. Dill: Broker-DealerRegulation Under
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934: The Case Of Independent Contracting,
1994 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 189 (1994) ("Independent Contracting"). The definition
(as modified in 1975), excludes persons whose functions are solely clerical or
ministerial for purposes of Section 15(b) of the 1934 Act (except for purposes of
Section 15(b)(6), which grants the SEC direct sanctioning authority against
associated persons. Id.
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the SEC, registration with an SRO, such as the NASD, is
required.2 7
All persons associated with a broker-dealer must be controlled and supervised by that broker-dealer. Supervision and
control are viewed as key elements in the regulatory scheme.2 s
Associated persons are held out to the investing public as repre-

sentatives of the broker-dealer 9 and so as to protect the public,
the broker-dealer must supervise and control what is being done
by its associated persons. The issue, of course, is the breadth of
that supervision and control. It is one thing to supervise and control those activities carried out in its name30 or on its behalf, but it
is quite another to extend the broker-dealer responsibility and lia-

27. NASD Manual-Schedule To the By-Laws, Schedule C. Par. 1785(1)(b)
(CCH) (1994).
28. The SEC has pointed out that the notice requirement of Section 40 of the
NASD rules is "not merely to trigger an employer's response, but also to prevent
unauthorized transactions and to enable the employer to provide appropriate
supervision for transactions that it permits." In the Matter of Zester Herbert
Hatfield, Exchange Act Release No. 25488 1988 SEC LEXIS 551 at 6 (Mar. 18,
1988). Moreover, "the purpose of the NASD's interpretation is not merely to
prevent customers from being misled as to the employing firms' sponsorship of
their salesmen's transactions," but also these NASD interpretations serves the
very important functions of protecting employers against investor claims arising
from a salesman's private transactions and protecting public investors by
ensuring proper supervision of a brokers sales efforts. Anthony J. Amato, 45 SEC
282, 285 (1973). In the Matter of Zester Herbert Hatfield; 1988 SEC LEXIS 551
at 6.
Further relating to the purpose of the NASD's interpretation of Section 40,
the SEC has noted that the purpose of the NASD's interpretation is not only to
prevent exposure of the employer to investor claims arising from transactions
over which it had no control but also to protect public investors by ensuring
oversight and supervision of a brokers sales efforts. "Where employees effect
transactions for customers outside of the normal channels and without disclosure
to the employer, the public is deprived of protection of which it is entitled to
expect" (emphasis added). Anthony J. Amato, Exchange Act Release No. 10265,
1973 SEC LEXIS 2769 (June 29, 1973).
29. Voluntary Benefit Systems Corporation of America, SEC No-Action
Letter, 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 814 (Nov. 14, 1995).
30. See, e.g., Private Ledger, SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act LEXIS
1152 (Nov. 17, 1992).
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bility3l to other activities conducted and regulated3 2 by federal regulation, separate and distinct from the 1934 Act.
(c) Registered Representatives.
Members of the broker-dealer sales force, whether employee
or independent contractor, are associated persons of a brokerdealer and must register with the NASD as registered representatives. NASD registration arguably furthers the ability of the
NASD to effect its statutorily mandated objective to regulate these
market professionals subject to SEC oversight.33 No such similar
self-regulatory scheme exists with respect to investment advisers
and/or their associated persons.
2. Investment Advisers, Associated Persons and Advisory
Representatives.
(a) Investment Adviser.
Anyone in the business of advising others as to the value of
securities or with respect to investing, purchasing or selling secur31. This lack of liability presumes no fraud or collusion and that the investor
through disclosure has been informed of the distinction in functions and persons
responsible for performing each.
32. This is clearly recognized in the broker-dealer/financial institution
networking arrangements, both by the SEC and NASD. A broker-dealer has no
authority to supervise and control the banking activities of its dually-employed
registered representatives. What then explains the extension of SRO oversight
and broker-dealer supervision and control over the investment advisory
activities of its members' registered representatives? Both activities, banking
and investment advisory activities, are subject to regulatory schemes, distinct
from that of the broker-dealer activity. While banking activities; however, seem
to be exempt from the supervision and control of NASD members, no similar
exemption is extended for statutorily regulated investment advisory activity.
The NASD mandates through special promulgation that its member brokerdealers supervise the investment activities of its registered representatives who
are also separately registered investment advisers. Obviously, the rationale for
the foregoing distinction in treatment cannot be rationally attributed to the
presence or absence of a separate regulatory scheme. Rather the rationale
behind this disparity in treatment of NASD imposed oversight of broker-dealer/
investment adviser relationships, but not broker-dealer/banking relationships
may better be explained by the SEC's desire "ex cathedra"to do that which it has
been unable to achieve legislatively.

"...

supplement to its own regulatory

Legislation To Amend Investment
functions under the [Advisors] Act...
Advisers Act of 1940 Proposed by Securities and Exchange Commission;
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 491, 1975 SEC LEXIS 121 at 2 (Dec. 15,
1975).
33. 15A U.S.C. § 780A (1981).
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ities for compensation is an investment adviser. 34 As with the def-

initional requirement for the term broker-dealer, to fall within the
definitional reach of investment adviser under the Advisers Act
requires a regularity of participation3 5 in providing investment
advice. Regularity does not mean, however, sole, principal or significant. 3 6 Moreover, as noted earlier, registration as an investment adviser does not obviate the requirement of a person who
also with regularity of participation effects securities transactions

34. Investment adviser means
...
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to
the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in,
purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of
a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning
securities; but does not include (A) a bank, or any bank holding company
as defined in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which is not an
investment company; (B) any lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher
whose performance of such services is solely incidental to the practice of
his profession; (C) any broker or dealer whose performance of such
services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or
dealer and who receives no special compensation therefor; (D) the
publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or
financial publication of general and regular circulation; (E) any person
whose advice, analyses, or reports relate to no securities other than
securities which are direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed as to
principal or interest by the United States, or securities issued or
guaranteed by corporations in which the United States has a direct or
indirect interest which shall have been designated by the Secretary of
Treasury, pursuant to section 3(a)(12) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as exempted securities for the purposes of that Act; or (F) such
other persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as the
Commission may designate by rules and regulations or order. (emphasis
added)
As amended by Act of July 1, 1966, Section 13(j), 80 Stat. 243.
35. "The staff considers a person to be 'in the business of providing advice if
the person ... on anything, other than rare, isolated and non-periodic instances,
provides specific investment advice." Securities and Exchange commission, 52
Fed. Reg. 38.400 (1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 276).
36. Applicability of the Investment Advisors Act to Financial Planners,
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisers Act
Rel. No. 1092 1987 SEC LEXIS 3487 (Oct. 8, 1987); Private Ledger, SEC NoAction Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act LEXIS 1152 at 1 (Nov. 17, 1989) (where the staff
noted that "... . advising others need not be the sole or principal business of a
person in order for the person to be an investment adviser").
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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from registering as a broker-dealer. 3 7Of equal force, however, is
the fact that registration as a broker-dealer under the 1934 Act
does not obviate the need to register under the Advisers Act if the
broker-dealer or its associated persons engage in investment advisory activities other than on an incidental basis.
Specifically excluded from this definition of investment
adviser and, therefore, registration as an investment adviser, are
broker-dealers whose advisory services are merely incidental"8
and who receive no special compensation for these incidental advisory services. 3 9 This exclusion is equally applicable to any regis37. Philip A. Loomis, Jr., The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and The
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 214, 246 (1959).
38. Section 202(a)(11)(c) excludes from the definition of investment adviser
"any broker or dealer whose performance of such [advisory] services is solely
incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives
no special compensation therefore." "Solely incidental" and "special
compensation" are key terms in this exclusion. Accordingly, broker-dealers who
also manage discretionary accounts or provide advisory services in connection
with formulating a financial plan and matching securities products to implement
that financial plan would not be considered merely incidental and registration of
such broker-dealers as investment advisers would be required. Applicability of
the Investment Advisors Act to Certain Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act
Release No. 15215; Investment Advisors Act Release No. 6401, 1978 SEC LEXIS
575 (Oct. 5, 1978). Additional activities not considered solely incidental are
advisory services offered as part of overall plan to assess the financial situation of
a customer and formulate a financial plan as well as investment services or other
investment management services tailored to the specific long-term investment
need of individual clients. Townsend and Associates, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1994 SEC No-Act LEXIS 739 (Sept. 21, 1994).
This exclusion from investment adviser registration... was included in the
Advisers Act because broker-dealers routinely give investment advice as part of
their brokerage activities, yet are already subject to extensive regulation under
the 1934 Act and possibly state law. As a consequence, Congress determined
that if a broker-dealer did not give investment advice other than in the ordinary
course of its brokerage business (determined by the "solely incidental" and
"special compensation" elements), the additional regulation of the Advisers Act
was unnecessary." Thomas Lemke and Gerald Lins, Regulation of Investment
Advisers, 1-9 (1996).
39. Special compensation is interpreted to mean a "clearly definable charge
for investment advice". According to the SEC's General Counsel, "the essential
distinction .

.

. in considering borderline cases . . . is the distinction between

compensation for advice itself and compensation for services of another character
to which advice is merely incidental." SEC Inv. Adv. Act. Rel. No. 2. The
General Counsel also stated that "when a charge is made only to customers to
whom advice is given, the charge constitutes special compensation." Id. See also
Townsend, 1994 SEC No-Act LEXIS 739, (No-Act. 2209, 1610, 2016, 2525). A
broker-dealer, therefore, may rely on this exclusion of Section 202(a)(11)(C)
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tered representative or other employee or independent contractor
whose incidental investment advisory activities are subject to control by the broker-dealer. 40 By contrast, any registered representative who provides advice independent of, or separate from, his
broker-dealer employer, may not rely on this incidental exclusion
from the definition of an investment adviser. 4 1 Reliance on the
under the Advisers Act so long as all of his clients are charged a uniform price,
despite the fact that investment advice is rendered and if such advice rendered is
solely incidental to the conduct of the broker-dealer's business. A broker-dealer,
however, was required to also register as an investment advisor where the
broker-dealer received a fee in connection with an arrangement whereby a
registered investment adviser provided portfolio management services to the
broker-dealer's customers. Reinholdt & Gardner, 70-71 Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH)
78,120 (1970).
"The focus of the 'solely incidental' element is on the nature and amount of
the investment advice the broker-dealer provides to clients in its brokerage
capacity. While the requirements of this element have not been specifically
defined, the SEC has indicated generally that investment advice offered as apart
of an overall financial plan for the client is not considered 'solely incidental' to
brokerage, whereas investment advice on individual securities transactions is."
Investment Advisors Act Release No. 471, 1975 SEC LEXIS 980 (Aug. 20, 1975).
40. Private Ledger, SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1152
(Nov. 17, 1989) at 2. "Incidental" in this context means providing advisory
services within the scope of one's employment with a broker-dealer.
Applicability of the Investment Advisors Act to Financial Planners, Pension
Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a
Component of Other Financial Services, 1987 SEC LEXIS 3487, Investment
Advisors Act Release No. 1092 (Oct. 8, 1987). Presumably, the extension of this
exclusion is premised not only on the control of the broker-dealer, but also that
the investment advisory activities of the registered representative are conducted,
on behalf of the controlling broker-dealer and are themselves incidental.
Accordingly, the SEC staff opined to an inquiring registered representative that
" . . if you provide information to your clients regarding investment in foreign
securities with the knowledge and approval of a broker-dealer employer as part
of your regular broker-dealer business, and do not receive any special
compensation for the giving of such advice, you would not be required to register
with the commission as an investment adviser." (emphasis added). Private
Ledger, SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act LEXIS 1152 at 2. See also
Professional Education and Planning Alliance, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 826
(July 18,1989).
41. Professional Education and Planning Alliance, SEC No-Action Letter,
1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 826 (July 18, 1989). "While the broker-dealer exclusion
is silent regarding the status of a broker-dealer's registered representatives, the
SEC staff has clarified that a registered representative may rely on the brokerdealer exclusion provided that the representative (1) is giving investment advice
within the scope of his employment with the broker-dealer, (2) such advice is
solely incidental to the employer's brokerage activities, and (3) there is no special
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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incidental exclusion in the foregoing instance is not appropriate

since the investment advisory activities, are distinct from the
services rendered on behalf of the broker-dealer (i.e., not merely
incidental to those services), and, according to the SEC would not
42
be subject to control by his/her broker-dealer employer.

Similarly, the staff has suggested that separate Advisers Act
registration is required if the registered representative's investment advisory activities are: (1) conducted without the knowledge

of... [the] employer broker-dealer, (2) conducted with the knowledge but without the approval of... [the] employer broker-dealer,
or (3) conducted independently of . . . [the] broker-dealer. ..
compensation for the advice." See Institute of Certified Financial Planners, SEC
No-Action Letter (Jan. 21, 1986); Regulation of Investment Advisers at 1-10.
42. "Thus, if a registered representative provides advice independent of, or
separate from, his broker-dealer employer, by establishing a separate financial
planning service or otherwise, he or she may not rely on the exclusion in Section
202(a)(11)(C) with respect to those investment advisory activities because such
activities would not be subject to control by his or her broker-dealer employer."
(emphasis added). Regulation of Investment Advisers at 1-10. "Ifthe advice is
provided separately from the representative's employment with the brokerdealer, or without the broker-dealer's approval, the exclusion is not available to
the representative." Elmer D. Robinson, SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 6, 1985);
Amherst Financial Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 23, 1995);
Regulation of Investment Advisers at 1-10. A registered representative whose
relationship to a broker-dealer is that of an independent contractor can give
advice about securities in reliance on the broker-dealer exclusion only if these
activities are supervised by the broker-dealer. Letter from Douglas Scarff,
Director, Division of Market Regulation, to Gordon S. Macklin, President, NASD,
SEC No-Action Letter (June 18, 1982); Regulation of Investment Advisers at 110.
43. Elmer D. Robinson, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1610
(Jan. 6, 1986). The staff earlier noted that:
If you, as a financial planner not supervised by the broker-dealer for
whom you act as a registered representative, give advice more involved
than a mere discussion in general terms of the advisability of investing
in securities in the context of a discussion of economic matters or the
role of securities investments in a client's overall financial plan, or
discuss, more frequently than on rare and isolated instances, the
advisability of investing in, or issue reports or analyses as to, specific
securities or specific categories of securities (e.g., bonds, mutual funds,
technology stocks, etc.), you would be required to be registered as an
investment adviser even if the compensation for such service is only a
share, as a registered representative, of any brokerage commissions
paid by the client on the purchase of mutual fund shares or private or
public offerings.
Southmark Financial Services, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
2525 at 1-2 (August 23, 1984). See also Financial Planning Service, SEC NoPublished by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997
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Requiring registration under the Advisers Act in each of the foregoing instances is rational; indeed, mandated by the regulatory
shibboleth. Also imposing the employer broker-dealer supervision
over the separately regulated investment advisory activities, however, is not.44 These functions are acknowledged to be different
Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2522 (Aug. 20, 1984). Brent A. Neiser,
CFP Director of Government Affairs Institute of Certified Financial Planners,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1653 (Jan. 21, 1986).
44. See In the Matter of J. Frederick Keaton, Exchange Act Release No. 31082
1992 SEC LEXIS 2002 (Aug. 24, 1992) (The SEC reviewed the NASD finding that
Keaton, a registered representative of Martin Nelson and Co., Inc., a registered
broker-dealer and NASD member, because of Keaton's participation in private
securities transactions without giving the broker-dealer prior written
notification. While employed by MNC, Keaton organized 8 limited partnerships,
only the last 3 of which are challenged as outside the scope of his employment
and failing to give notice. With respect to partnerships 1-5 transactions
involving the partnerships generated commissions for both Keaton and the firm.
No commissions, however, were generated as a result of transactions interests in
partnerships 6-8 and Keaton never disclosed his activities in these latter
partnerships to MNC.).
It was found that Keaton failed to comply with Section 40 of the NASD Rules
of Fair Practice. The SEC noted that "
Keaton plainly went beyond a failure to follow the letter of the rule. He
knowingly deceived his employer, subverting safeguards that are essential to the
securities industry's regulatory scheme. Outside sales activities, even if
uncompensated, exposed investors to possible losses and employers to possible
liability. A securities firm, through which salesman are registered for the
protection of the public, must protect investors as well as itself through
supervisory measures that impose conditions on a salesman's employment. See
Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1573-4 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1621 (1991). To implement and enforce those measures, the
firm must be apprised of any associated person's outside involvement in
securities transactions. Keaton, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2002 at 4. It is important to
note, however, that the SEC's potential harm arose from undisclosed and, hence,
unmonitored outside sales activities but pointed to the fact that the partnership
agreement may have given investors the false impression that MNC was behind
the sales as it listed the address of MNC as that of the partnership and that stock
certificates would be held in safekeeping by MNC. Also of note is the distinction
between NASD Rules 40(c) and 40(d). Rule 40(c) addresses private securities
transactions for which the salesman may receive selling compensation while
Section 40(d) deals with transactions without sales compensation and provide
that the employer may, at its discretion, require the associated person to adhere
to specified conditions in connection with his participation in the transaction.
The SEC noted that this latter reference to restrictions may embrace a total
prohibition. In the Matter of Richard J. Greulich, Exchange Act Release No.
27896 1990 SEC LEXIS 671 (Apr. 11, 1990) (a number of issues of interest were
addressed: (1) the issue of whether or not the prohibition against double jeopardy
prohibited two private organizations such as the NASD and New York Stock
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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both by statute and the SEC.4 Imposing broker-dealer supervision and control here is inconsistent with the shibboleth and creates a real statutory dilemma. By exerting such supervision and
control, is not this broker-dealer engaging in investment advisory
services, using the RR/RIA merely as a conduit in violation of
Advisers Act Section 208(d)? What should the RR/RIA do if the
supervising broker-dealer tells him/her to conduct his/her investment advisory business in a manner the RR/RIA believes incompatible with the Advisers Act? Broker-dealers, not also registered
as investment advisers, are not competent to supervise a registered investment adviser or its associated persons in the conduct
of their regulated investment advisory business.
Once a registered representative's investment advisory activities are separate and distinct from his/her broker-dealer triggering investment adviser registration, broker-dealer supervision
and control should no longer be permitted or required. The investment advisory activities should be: (1) governed by the Advisers
Act, not by the broker-dealer; and (ii) should be controlled by the
RIA, not the broker-dealer. Indeed, any broker-dealer so supervising and controlling should raise concerns of whether or not such
broker-dealer is conducting an investment advisory business indirectly through the RR/RIA in violation of the regulatory shibboleth and Section 208 (d) of the Advisers Act.
(b) Associated Persons.

As with the 1934 Act, persons performing investment advisory services must register under the Advisers Act or be subject to
the supervision and control of the RIA.4s Those persons subject to
RIA supervision and control are its associated persons (officers,
directors, partners, employees and other persons in control relationship with the adviser)4 7 and advisory representatives. 4 So
Exchange with complimentary regulatory systems from instituting proceedings
based on the same misconduct. The SEC found no such prohibition). See Harold
C. Allen, 46 SEC 1218, 1222-1223 (1978;) Management Financial, Inc., 46 SEC
226, 234-235 (1976).
45. See, e.g., F.S. Mosely & Co., 70-71 Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 78,063.
46. Separate registration under the Advisers Act for an employee of an RIA is
unnecessary and inappropriate when his advice is provided solely on behalf of
the employer RIA. Bruce David Tyler, 1978 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. 81,683
(1978).
47. Ms. Corrinne E. Wood, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
2028 (Apr. 17, 1986). The term "person associated with an investment advisor"
means any partner, officer, or director of such investment adviser (or any person
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performing similar functions), or any person directly or indirectly controlling or
controlled by such investment adviser, including any employee of such
investment adviser, except that for the purposes of Section 203 of this title (other
than subsection (f) thereof, persons associated with an investment adviser whose
functions are clerical or ministerial shall not only be included in the meaning of
such term. The commission, may by rules and regulations classify, for the
purposes of any portion or portions of this title, persons, including employees
controlled by an investment adviser. The SEC staff has interpreted the term
"employee" for purposes of the foregoing definition to include independent
contractors whose activities are controlled by a registered investment adviser.
Id.
48. The term "advisory representative" under Rule 204-2(a)(12)(ii)(A) means:
any partner, officer or director of the investment adviser; any employee
who makes any recommendation, who participates in the determination
of which recommendation shall be made, or whose functions or duties
relate to the determination of which recommendation shall be made; any
employee who, in connection with his duties, obtains any information
concerning which securities are being recommended prior to the
effective dissemination of such recommendations; and any of the
following persons who obtain information concerning securities
recommendations being made by such investment adviser prior to the
effective dissemination of such recommendations or of the information
concerning such recommendations: (i) any person in a control
relationship to the investment adviser; (ii) any affiliates person of such
controlling person; and (iii) any affiliated person of such affiliated
person.
Rule 204-2(a)(12)(ii)(A) of the Advisers Act. The distinguishing factor between
the definition of an associated person and of an advisory representative focuses
upon the relationship between the actor and the conduct in which he engages. In
contrast, the basis of the term associated person, rests predominantly upon the
mere connection, or relationship, of the actor in respect to the investment
adviser.
Rule 204-2(a) of the Advisers Act imposes record-keeping with respect to
advisory representatives. The purpose of this record keeping is to expose and
deter improper trading practices violative of the fiduciary duty of RIA's owed to
their clients, such as scalping, illegal "soft dollar arrangements" and other
brokerage practices that might create conflicts of interest. Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 203, 1966-1967 Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 77,401 (Aug. 11, 1966);
Aetna Realty Investors, Inc. (July 11, 1986). No record keeping is required of
advisory representatives' personal securities transactions in shares of
unaffiliated opened funds. Similarly, the SEC staff excused record keeping
requirements with respect to certain so-called "Outside Limited Partners" who
were analogized ". . . to an incorporated investment adviser's non-controlling
shareholders, who are not included within the definition of advisory
representative unless they also have another relationship with the adviser that
is specified in the rule." W.R. Huff Asset Management Co., L.P., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 669 (Aug. 10, 1994). The Commission adopted
Rule 204-2(a)(12) as a means of preventing "scalping" which it described as a
practice whereby an investment adviser, or any person who obtains information
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long as the activity is conducted by an SEC registered entity or
controlled by such SEC registered entity, the desired regulatory
scheme is achieved. No additional oversight is warranted, legislatively or otherwise. Moreover, the RIA, not the broker-dealer,
should control the investment advisory activities of its associated
persons; no further control should be required. Persons dually
registered or acting as dual agents, both for the RIA and another,
raise anti-fraud and disclosure issues, not registration or control
issues.4 9 Registration and control issues should not be confused
with disclosure and anti-fraud issues.

III.

CONSEQUENCES OF SATISFYING THE DEFINITION.

Generally, anyone satisfying the statutory definitions of
either a broker-dealer or investment adviser must register as such
under the applicable statutory scheme, the 1934 Act or Advisers
Act, or be an associated person, subject to the supervision and control of the applicable registered entity. And, as noted above, registration under the 1934 Act does not obviate registration under the
Advisers Act.

concerning a securities recommendation being made by such investment adviser
prior to the dissemination of such information, trades on the anticipated shortrun market activity which may ensue from the issuance by the adviser of the
securities recommendations. W.R. Huff Asset Management Co., L.P., SEC NoAction Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act LEXIS 669 (citing Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 203, 1966 SEC LEXIS 365 (Aug. 11, 1966)). Investment Advisor Act
Release No. 136, 1975 SEC LEXIS 2180 (Feb. 21, 1975) (releases adopting and
amending Rule 204-2(a)(12)). We note that the. rule was intended to address
other conflicts of interests in addition to scalping. See American Syndicate
Advisors (pub. avail. Sept. 26, 1986) and Cortland Financial Group, Inc. (pub.
avail. Sept. 26, 1985) (no action relief denied notwithstanding the unlikelihood of
scalping because records potentially could reveal soft dollar arrangements or
other brokerage practices that might create a conflict of interest.
49. The only control issue raised is whether or not the RIA will permit their
respective associated persons to act contemporaneously for another or be
independently registered as a broker-dealer or RR, but control by a nonregistered entity under the Advisers Act should not also extend to the conduct of
these independent activities carried on pursuant to a separate regulatory
scheme.
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1. Register or Be Subject to the Control of the Registered
Entity.
(a) Broker-Dealer
Any person who meets the definition of a broker-dealer under
the 1934 Act must register as a broker-dealer or be an associated
person of a broker-dealer. 50 This exemption from registration for
natural persons associated with a broker-dealer; however, is not
applicable where this associated person engages in securities
transactions outside the scope of his/her employment with the registered broker-dealer. If the associated person engages in these
independent securities transactions, s/he must separately register
as a broker-dealer."'
(b) Investment Adviser
Similarly, any person who meets the definition of an investment adviser under Section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act must
register with the SEC unless otherwise excluded, exempt, or subject to the supervision and control of the RIA.52 And, by definition
50. Section 15(a)(1) of the 1934 Act requires registration of all persons
effecting securities transactions unless exempt. See In the Matter of Gordon
Wesley Sodorff, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 31134, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2190 at
14 (Sept. 2, 1992).
51. Moreover, failure to comply with the notice and consent provisions of
NASD Section 40 can result in a registered representative's improperly engaging
in business as an unregistered broker-dealer! In the Matter of Leonard L. Gooch;
Exchange Act Release No. 16751, 1980 SEC LEXIS 1665 (Apr. 16, 1980). See
also In The Matter of Charles A. Roth, Exchange Act Release No. 31085, 1992
SEC LEXIS 2006 (Aug. 25, 1992).
Section 40 has also been extended to apply to a situation where a registered
representative assisted an issuer in reacquiring its securities, see, e.g., Roth,
1992 SEC LEXIS 2006, and an indemnification agreement offered by a registered
representative in connection with the pledge of stock. See, e.g., William D.
George, Exchange Act Release No. 17136, 1980 SEC LEXIS 762 (Sept. 8, 1980).
In other words, the emphasis seems to have shifted from the phrase "securities
transaction" to the word "transaction". The SEC has stated that a duty exists
under Section 1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice "... to report to an employer
certain non-securities transactions." In the Matter of William Louis Morgan,
Exchange Act Release No. 32744, 1993 SEC LEXIS 2027 at 7 (Aug. 12, 1993)
(emphasis added).
52. The following persons need not separately register as an investment
adviser:
(i) persons excluded from the definition such as a broker-dealer whose
advisory services are "solely incidental" to its brokerage business
and receives no special compensation for such services; or
(ii) is exempt from registration, or,
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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one is deemed under control of an RIA "if it performs investment
advisory services on behalf of, and under the supervision or oversight of, the [RIA]." 53 If one performs investment advisory services
independent of the RIA, s/he must register under the Advisers
Act.
2. Duties and Liabilities.
Whether a registered broker-dealer 54 or RIA, 55 each has the

statutory responsibility to supervise and control their respective
(iii) is controlled by an RIA and, thus, an associated person of an RIA.
See Ms. Corinne E. Wood, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2028
(Apr. 17, 1986).
53. Ms. Corinne E. Wood, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act Lexis 2028
at 1 (Apr. 17, 1986).
54. 15 U.S.C-A. 780(b)(1981 & Supp. 1995) of the 1934 Act contains the
standard as applied to broker-dealers:
(4) The Commission, by order, shall censure, place imitations on the
activities, functions, or operations of, suspend for a period not exceeding
twelve months, or evoke the registration of any broker or dealer of it
finds, on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing, that such
censure, placing of limitations, suspension, or revocation is in the public
interest and that such broker or dealer, whether prior or subsequent to
becoming such, or any person associated with such broker or dealer,
whether prior or subsequent to becoming so associated(E) has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or
procured the violation by any other person of any provision of the
Securities Act of 1933, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940... the
rules or regulations under any of such statutes .

.

. or has failed

reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing violations of the
provisions of such statutes, rules, and regulations, another person
who commits such a violation, if such other person is subject to his
supervision. (Emphasis added.) For purposes of this subparagraph
(E) no person shall be deemed to have failed reasonably to supervise
any other person, if
(i) there have been established procedures, and a system for
applying such procedures, which would reasonably be expected
to prevent and detect, insofar as practicable, any such violation
by such other person, and
(ii) such person has reasonably discharged the duties and
obligations incumbent upon him by reason of such procedures
and system without reasonable cause to believe that such
procedures and system were not being complied with.
15 U.S.C.A. § 780(b)(6) of the Exchange Act incorporates 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 780(b)(4)(E) by reference and authorizes the Commission to impose similar
sanctions against individuals for failure reasonably to supervise individuals
associated with broker-dealers. Prior to the Securities Acts Amendments of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (1964) an individual supervisor could be
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sanctioned only if the firm was found to have committed a violation, and the
supervisor was found to have been the "cause" of the firm's violation. See, e.g.,
Reynolds & Co., 39 SEC. 902 (1960). The only sanctions available to the
Commission for such violations were suspensions or revocations of registration,
and these sanctions were generally brought against firms, not the supervisors
themselves. In 1963, the Special Study of the Securities Markets noted the need
for greater supervision by broker-dealers over their increasingly far-flung branch
offices and salespersons. See Report of the Special Study of the Securities
Markets of the SEC (1963), reprinted in H.R. Doc. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963), pt. 1 at 290-91, 328. The Commission then requested greater authority
from Congress to proceed directly against individuals for failures to supervise.
See S. Rep. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 44-45, 75-76 (1963).
15 U.S.C.A. § 780(b)(4)(E) and (bX6) of the Exchange Act were adopted as a
result of the Special Study. (These sections include language that allows the
Commission to sanction broker-dealer employees for "failing to reasonably
supervise" a person who commits a violation, with the important protection for
the supervisor that the violator must be subject to that employee's supervision.
The "safe harbor" provisions of 15 U.S.C.A. § 780(b)(4)(E) add that if a supervisor
has reasonably discharged the appropriate supervisory duties under procedures
established by the brokerage firm, and has no reason to believe that such
procedures were not complied with, the supervisor cannot be charged with
failure to supervise. Unfortunately, Congress did not specify what it meant by
the phrase "subject to the supervision". At a minimum, the phrase has been
interpreted to mean both that the Commission is limited as to whom it can
sanction for failure to supervise, and that Congress sand the Commission
intended that the brokerage community move toward more self-regulation.). The
Commission then stated that the duty of supervision could not be avoided by
pointing to the difficulties involved where facilities were expanding or by placing
the blame upon inexperienced personnel or by citing the pressures inherent in
competition for new business. In Wedbush Securities, Inc., 48 SEC. 963 (1988),
the Commission reemphasized the importance of self-regulation it had stated in
earlier cases. See In the Matter of Universal Heritage Investments Corp.,
Exchange Act Rel. No. 19308, 1982 SEC LEXIS 210 (December 8, 1982); In the
Matter of Michael E. Tennenbaum, Exchange Act Rel. No. 18429, 1982 SEC
LEXIS 2434 (Jan. 19, 1982); Reynolds & Co., 39 SEC. 902, 916 (1960). In large
organizations it is especially imperative that those in authority exercise
particular vigilance when indications of irregularity reach their attention.
Self-regulation was also a key component of the Commission's 1985 case, In
the Matter of Smith Barney, Harris Upham and Co., Inc. and Robert G. Heck,
Exchange Act Release No. 21813, 1985 SEC LEXIS 2051 (Mar. 15, 1985).
55. Sections 203(e)(5) and 204A of the Advisers Act is the statutory basis of
the requirement of supervision and control. Section 203 (e)(5) empowers the SEC
to sanction any person who:
has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or
procured the violation by any other person of any provision of the
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
Investment Company Act of 1940, this title, the Commodity Exchange
Act, the rules or regulations under any of such statutes, or the rules of
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, or has failed reasonably to
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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associated persons.5 6 Liability is unlikely where the control person did not know, nor have reason to know, in the exercise of due
care in the selection and supervision of his/her employees, of the
employee's action(s) or inaction(s).57 Notwithstanding the foregosupervise, with a view to preventing violations of the provisions of such
statutes, rules, and regulations, another person who commits such a
violation, if such other person is subject to his supervision. For the
purposes of this paragraph (5) no person shall be deemed to have failed
reasonably to supervise any person, if(A) there have been established procedures, and a system for
applying such procedures, which would reasonably be expected to
prevent and detect, insofar as practicable, any such violation by
such other person, and
(B) such person has reasonably discharged the duties and
obligations incumbent upon him by reason of such procedures and
system without reasonable cause to believe that such procedures
and system were not being complied with.
See also Kleinwart Benson Investment Management Limited, SEC No-Action
Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1181 (Dec. 15, 1993); TBA Financial Corp. SEC
No-Action letter (LEXIS avail. Dec. 7, 1983).
56. The SEC expects supervisors to "respond vigorously when wrongdoing or
possible indications of wrongdoing are brought to their attention." According to
the SEC, supervisors should act decisively to detect and prevent violations of the
federal securities laws. In the Matter of Kemper Financial Services, Inc., at 18
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1494, 1995 SEC LEXIS 1311 (June 6,
1995); see also [In re] Edwin Kantor, Exchange Act Release No. 32341, 1993 SEC
LEXIS 1240 (May 20, 1993).
"An adviser's or broker-dealer's officers and employees - including attorneys
and compliance personnel - may be sanctioned for failure to supervise others.
Unfortunately, the SEC has not clearly delineated when a person or officer is in a
'supervisory' position. Rather, this is a facts-and-circumstances determination
which turns upon the degree of responsibility, ability or authority of the
supervisory person to affect the conduct of the wrongdoing employee." In the
Matter of Exchange Act Release No. 31554, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2939 (Dec. 3, 1992),
Regulation of Investment Advisors at 2-89.
The Commission has also continually stressed the importance of strong
broker-dealer compliance programs. In one case, Shearson, Hamil & Co. ,42.
SEC. 811 (1965), the Commission noted that it is not sufficient for a brokerdealer to establish a system of supervisory procedures that rely solely on
supervision by branch managers. See also Alfred Bryant Tallman, Jr., 44 SEC.
230, 233 (1970); Edward H. Fleishman, Toward Neutral Principles:Compliance
Professionals, 8/6/92 N.Y.L.J. 5, (col. 1); In the Matter of Prudential-Bache
Securities, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 22755, (1985-1986 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. R. (CCH) 83,948 (January 2, 1986).
57. See, e.g., Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.
1967), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942, cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968). See also
Elmer D. Robinson, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1610. Investment Association, Inc.
(Pub. avail. Sept. 2, 1977), Theodore R. Woodley (Pub. avail. Sept. 2, 1977)
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ing, however, where the controlling person benefits from the
improper acts of his/her agents, even if unaware of these acts, liability may attach.58 On the other hand, where the activity
engaged in is not in the name of, or on behalf of, the employer and
the employing broker-dealer or RIA, as the case may be, does not
benefit, how can responsibility or liability be reasonably imposed
upon such employing broker-dealer or RIA?59 Indeed, liability
should not attach for the actions of one who is separately registered and engaged in activities, not carried on in the name of or on
behalf of the employer broker-dealer or RIA, as the case may be. 60
Moreover, even if a controlled person is not registered under a separate federal regulation, the issue should be disclosure sufficient
to avoid confusion and misleading the public. The purpose of
requiring supervision and control is to prevent violation of the federal securities laws. 61 In addition to this statutorily-mandated
(where SEC staff opined that broker-dealer consent required in order for his/her
registered representative to register as an RIA under contract law or otherwise).
58. See, e.g., Sennot v. Rodman & Renshaw (Oct. 15, 1973), 1973 CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rptr. 94,174 (where Justices Douglas and Blackman, dissenting from
the majority's denial of certiorari,embraced the idea of imposing liability where
the employing broker-dealer benefitted from the fraudulent acts of its
representative). See also Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
59. See Huaser v. Farrell, 14 F.3d. 1338 (9th Cir.) (broker-dealer held not
liable under the federal securities laws or respondeat superior for
misrepresentations of its registered representatives in connection with an
investment which was not a promotion of the broker-dealer and investors could
not reasonably have believed the broker-dealer had anything to do with that
promotion).
60. See, e.g., Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 89-90 CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rptr.
94,760 (N.D. 111. June 27, 1989) (where liability under respondeat
superior was not imposed because of the lack of the fact finder's finding that the
fraud was perpetrated within the scope of the employees' employment). See also
Safeco Securities, Inc., 45 SEC. 303 (1973) (where the SEC overruled the NASD's
earlier findings against a member firm stating that the investment club in which
the registered representative had no connection with his broker-dealer firm's
business and the broker-dealer was not a member of the investment club (i.e. the
investment club was outside the scope of his employment with the broker-dealer
and therefore, the broker-dealer had no duty to supervise.)).
61. To assist this broker-dealer supervision and control is the RR notice
provision of Article III, Sections 40 and 43 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice.
According to the SEC, "IT]he duty of a member firm's employee to inform his
employer regarding certain private securities transactions is both longstanding
and essential. It protects the firm from exposure to loss and litigation, and
investors from the hazards of unmonitored sales. The obligation arises under the
general ethical considerations of Section 1 and under the specific requirements of
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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supervision and control requirement, broker-dealer members of
the NASD must also comply with the NASD imposed requirements and procedures.62 There is no such comparable dual regulatory oversight statutorily imposed on registered investment
advisers, albeit, as noted here, some registered investment advisers are subjected to the SRO broker-dealer oversight of the
NASD.6 s
Expanding the supervision and control responsibilities of broker-dealers in no-action positions and by means of its power over
NASD rule-making, the SEC has conscripted 1934 Act brokerdealers and enlisted the NASD, a self-regulatory organization
Section 40." In the Matter of William Louis , Exchange Act Release No. 32744;
1993 SEC LEXIS 2027 (Aug. 12, 1993). But see In the Matter of Zester Herbert
Hatfield, Exchange Act Release No. 25488; 1988 SEC LEXIS 551 at 4 (March 18,
1988) (where the SEC refers to concerns related to a salesman's "private
transactions"). Moreover, there is also a shift from effecting the securities
transaction to playing a "substantial role" in the sales of securities, In the Matter
of the Application of Allen S. Klosowski, Exchange Act Release No. 25467; 1988
SEC LEXIS 507 at 2 (March 15, 1988) (where a violation of Section 40 was found
where the registered representative had referred clients to a sponsor of limited
partnerships, but did not handle the resulting sales), or the matter being
"inextricably linked to a securities transaction." In the Matter of William D.
George, Exchange Act Relese No. 17136, 1980 SEC LEXIS 762 (Sept. 8, 1980).
62. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Article III, Section 27. See also Wall Street
West, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 18320, 1981 SEC LEXIS 163 (Dec. 9, 1981)
(where NASD found a failure to supervise, and the SEC concurred, even though
no evidence of any customer injury was presented. The NASD's purpose is to
protect public interests, not redress private wrongs.). According to the SEC "[A]
securities firm through which salesmen are registered for the protection of the
public, must protect investors as well as itself through supervisory measures
that impose conditions on a salesman's employment." In the Matter of Jay
Frederick Keeton, Exchange Act Release No. 31082; 1992 SEC LEXIS 2002 at 4
(Aug. 24, 1992) (citing Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1573-74
(9th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991)).
63. There is no comparable self-regulatory organization for investment
advisers. Indeed, although there have been proposals or calls for an agency
comparable to the NASD to regulate investment advisers, to-date no such selfregulatory authority has been approved. Even if these proposals or calls
evidence a need, this need does not warrant assertion of jurisdiction over
Advisory activities by the NASD since neither it nor its members are necessarily
experienced or skilled in bringing to bear the level, scope or breadth of
accountability necessary or appropriate to investment advisory activities.
Moreover, for NASD member firms to assert authority and power over the
investment advisory activities of their registered representatives may obviate
the present exclusion for broker-dealers from the definition of investment adviser
under the Advisers Act, thus requiring that they themselves become separately
registered as investment advisers.
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established under the Exchange Act, not the Advisers Act, to
assert oversight jurisdiction over investment advisory activities
separately registered under the Advisers Act of persons dually
registered as RIAs, individually or through separately incorporated entities, and registered representatives.64 Not only is this a
usurpation of authority, but it also cloaks supplementary regulatory authority and responsibility on a brokerage firm to regulate
an investment advisory function, more suitably subject to the control of the RIA, registered under the Advisers Act. Moreover, any
broker-dealer asserting this authority should raise both the issue
of the continuing applicability of Advisers Act Section
202(a)(11)(C) exclusion 5 as well as the concern over structural
arrangements in which the RIA is used merely as a conduit for an
unregistered entity in violation of Advisers Act Section 208(d).
And, if the foregoing issues and concerns were not enough, the
additional concern of the resulting uneveness in regulation of
investment advisory activities is extant. For only RR/RIA
arrangements have not only SEC oversight, but also the supplementary oversights of 1934 Act entities. This is not good policy
and is inconsistent with the regulatory shibboleth.
As noted above, persons in control 66 of others have liability for
the action(s) or inaction(s), conducted on their behalf or in their
names, by these controlled persons under the federal securities
laws 6 7 or the common law. 68 Accordingly, RIAs must supervise
64. Imposing the requirement of notice as required under Article III, Sections
40 and 43 is eminently reasonable and the supervisory broker-dealer then
exercising control by approving or disapproving is also consistent with the
regulatory shibboleth. Requiring broker-dealer supervision and control over any
separately regulated activity for which the RR has registered does not, however,

make sense.
65. Broker-dealers are specifically excluded from the definition of investment
adviser under the Advisers Act and, thus, registration under the Advisers Act so
long as their investment advisory activities are "incidental".
66. Generally, any person who has the power by agreement, stock ownership,
or otherwise, to control the direction, management or policies of another is a
controlling person. Kennedy v. Tallant, Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 95, 779 (1976).

The good faith requirement of Section 20 has been interpreted to be satisfied
when it is "shown that the controlling person maintained and enforced a
reasonable and proper system of supervision and internal control over controlled
person so as to prevent, as far as possible violations of Section 10(b) and Rule
10(b)(5)." Zweig v. The Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1134-35 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
67. If investment advisory activities are not conducted in the RIA's name,
additional RIA registration is required by the person performing these services.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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TBA Financial Corp. [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 77, 563.
The regulatory concern whenever a registered representative engages in
activities outside the scope of his employing broker-dealer is that "the public is
deprived of protection which it is entitled to expect". Moreover, in such an
instance, if the outside business activities involved effecting securities
transaction, because the activities are not conducted for or on behalf of the
employing broker-dealer, the registered representative would acting in violation
of the 1934 Act registration requirements unless such registered representative
separately registered under the 1934 Act. Only where the registered
representative/associated person is conducting activities, on behalf, of his
employing broker-dealer, is such a registered representative exempt from
registration requirements of Section 15(a)(1) of the 1934 Act. See generally In
the Matter of Gordon Wesley Sodoroff, Exchange Act Release No. 31134; 1992
SEC LEXIS 2190 at 21 (Sept. 2, 1992); Private Ledger, SEC No-Action Letter,
1990 SEC No-Act LEXIS 1221 at 5 (Sept. 5, 1990); Hunt v. Miller, 1990 Fed. Sec.
L. Rptr. (CCH) 95, 392 (July 18, 1990); In the Matter of Kemper Financial
Services, Inc., Investment Advisors Act Release No. 1387, [1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 85, 237 (Oct. 20, 1993). Violations of Section 15(b)(4)(E)
and 15(b)(6)(A) are predicated on a violation of the federal securities laws by a
person associated with a broker-dealer and under the supervisory jurisdiction of
that broker-dealer supervisory principals or staff. The elements of proof
necessary in finding a violation are:
1. An underlying securities law violation;
2. Association (employment) of the registered representative or other
person who committed the violation;
3. Supervisory jurisdiction over that person; and
4. Failure of the broker-dealer and/or supervisory personnel to
reasonably supervise the person who violated the securities laws,
with the standard of reasonableness being whether supervision was
conducted with a view to preventing violations of the securities laws.
The so-called safe harbor provision of Sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6)(A)
provide that a broker-dealer or associated person shall not be deemed to have
failed reasonably supervise if procedures and a system for applying those
procedures have been established which "would reasonably be expected to
prevent and detect, insofar as practicable, any such violation" and the person as
"reasonably discharged the duties and obligations incumbent upon him . . .
without reasonably cause to believe that such procedures and systems were not
complied with." Exchange Act, Section 15(b)(4)(E) 1-2. The standard of
reasonableness applicable to remedial actions for failure to supervise under
Section 15(b) is measured as "reasonable supervision under the attendant
circumstances" Arthur James Huff, 48 SEC Docket 878, 883 (1991) (citing Louie
R. Trujillo, 43 SEC Docket 690, 695). It is important to note that the SEC
acknowledges that the factual analysis required to determine whether
supervision is or is not reasonable is not res ipsa loquitur or strict liability (i.e.,
whereby the finding of an underlying violation requires a finding of failure to
supervise). The Congress in adopting the supervision provision stated: "[because
of the provisions Section 15(b)(4)(E) 1-2 of the Exchange Act] a supervisory
employee is ... not an absolute guarantor of the conduct of those whom he has
the power to supervise." S. Rep. No. 379, 88th Cong., First Session (1963).
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and control their associated persons and, if they fail do so, may
have liability for such persons actions and inactions. Similarly,
RRs are controlled by their employing broker-dealer and, accordingly, that broker-dealer may have liability for the action(s) or
inaction(s) of such employed registered representatives. 6 9 The
On its face, the broker-dealer supervision statute provides a much "clearer
statement of the applicable standard, namely whether a broker-dealer or
associated person has 'failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing
violations of the provisions of the securities statutes and rules, another person
who commits such a violation... unless 'there have been established procedures
and a system of applying such procedures which could reasonably be expected to
prevent and detect, insofar as practicable, any such violations by such other
person'." Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 780(b)(4)(E). Under Section 780(b), the
court must only determine whether the supervisory procedures in system of
applying those procedures could have reasonably been expected to prevent and
detect fraudulent activities. Accordingly, only under Section 20(a) controlling
person liability determinations is it appropriate to determine whether
supervision would have prevented the loss. SEC v. Lums, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (where the brokerage house was not held liable when the court
could not construct any system of supervision that would have prevented the
injury that occurred).
In assessing sanctions for violation of Section 15(b)(4)(E), due regard must
be given to the facts and circumstances of each case since sanctions are not
intended to punish but rather to protect the public from future harm. Berko v.
SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1963); Leo Glassman, 46 SEC 209, 211 (1975).
Sanctions, however, should also serve as a deterrent to others. Richard C.
Spangler, Inc., 46 SEC 238, 254 N.67 (1976). The following factors are often
considered when imposing administrative sanctions:
"... the egregiousness of the defendant's actions, the isolated or recurrent nature
of the infraction, the degree of scienter involved, the sincerity of the defendant's
assurances against future violations, the defendant's recognition of the wrongful
nature of his conduct, and the likelihood that his occupation will present
opportunities for future violations." Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th
Cir. 1979), affd. 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
68. Respondeat superior, for example, is a common law doctrine which may
result in liability to the employer occasioned by an action or inaction of his/her
employee. See, e.g., Carroll v. John Hancock Distributors, Inc., 93-94 Transfer
Binder Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 98,200 (March 14, 1994) (where the court stated
that the employer broker-dealer, who failed to supervise, could be liable under
respondeat superior for securities fraud perpetrated by its employees). The
imposition of broker-dealer liability is justified on the basis of the duty owed by
the broker-dealer to supervise in an adequate and reasonable manner its
registered representatives. Isaacs v. Chartered New England Corp., 378 F.
Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
69. The imposition of broker-dealer liability under the federal securities laws
is justified on the basis of the duty owed by the broker-dealer to supervise in an
adequate and reasonable manner its registered representatives. Isaacs, 278 F.
Supp. 370.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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question, of course, is under what circumstances does or should
liability attach to an RIA or broker-dealer for the separate and
distinct regulated activities of their respective associated persons
conducted independently and pursuant to registration under other
federal statutes. Achieving consistency in answers to this question is elusive. SEC staff holdings, as highlighted above and discussed below, in RIA networking and other strategic alliance
relationships is varied. The difficulty seems in the consistent SEC
staff application of the simple truths of the regulatory shibboleth
and Section 208(d), principally in the contexts of RR/RIA and RIA/
financial institution arrangements.70 But why there is difficulty is
not easily explained. If the registered representative engages in
outside business activities which do not involve effecting securities transactions or the RIA associated person engages in nonadvisory services, and assuming disclosure and no fraud, are not
the foregoing regulatory concerns addressed. All activities governed by the 1934 Act or the Advisers Act, as the case may be,
would be performed consistent with the statutory mandate.
Notwithstanding this compelling simplicity, the SEC and the
NASD have insisted on extending a broker-dealer's supervision
over non-brokerage advisory activities of RR/RIAs through Section
40 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice and the SEC staff has wiggled and waffled on the degree of RIA control required depending
upon the alliance being forged.
Regulated activities governed by. distinct federal registration
appears to explain the duality permitted in broker-dealer/financial institution networking arrangements without requiring broker-dealer supervision over financial institution-type activities. 7 '
The regulatory emphasis here is on avoiding public misperception,
remedied by disclosure and the like. For whatever reason, these
same regulators in RR/RIA and RIA/financial institution situations confuse regulation and control concerns with disclosure,
deception, public misperception and other anti-fraud concerns.
When investment advisory activities are supervised and controlled only by an RIA, notwithstanding any duality extant
between the RIA and a broker-dealer and/or RIA/financial institution, the objectives of the regulatory shibboleth and the statute
70. Section 202(a)(ii)(A) excludes banks and bank holding companies from the
definition of investment adviser.
71. See, e.g., In the Matter of Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., Stein Roe &
Farnham Exchange Act Release No. 24018 [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rptr. (CCH) 84, 116.
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are effected. No regulated entity is being used merely as a conduit;
and no regulated activity is being conducted, or supervised, by an
unregistered entity.
If the investment advisory activities conducted by the associated person or advisory representative of an RIA, on its behalf or
in its name, are supervised and controlled by the RIA, why should
any non-RIA (i.e., broker-dealer) supervision be required? Further, why should RIA's responsibilities extend to non-advisory
services of that controlled person (i.e., banking)? Why is sole RIA
control insisted upon in RIA/financial institution networking
arrangements, but not in instances involving dual agents who
serve both as broker-dealer and an RIA (RR/RIA)? Indeed, in this
latter instance the SEC staff appears to insist that the RIA yield
to the broker-dealer. The issues in these dual relationships and/or
networking arrangements should not be control by one registered
entity over the activities governed by separate registration, but
rather whether the registered entity, broker-dealer or RIA, as the
case may be, will permit such duality by its agents and, if so, the
requisite disclosure to avoid public misperception.72 Duality
72. In 1988, the NASD announced the SEC approval of Section 43 of the
NASD Rules of Fair Practice, 1988 NASD Notice to Members 86; 1988 NASD
LEXIS 207 citing SEC approval in SEC Release No. 34-26178 (Oct. 13, 1988)
which provides:
In divining the boundary between Sections 40 and 43, the NASD suggested
that all transactions executed on behalf of a client in which the RR/RIA
participated would be subject to Section 40. "Transactions executed on behalf of
the customer in which the RR/RIA participated in the execution would be subject
to the full 'for compensation' provisions of Section 40 . . . ." Id. at 7.
"Transactions executed without compensation would be subject to the 'noncompensation' provision of Section 40." Id. Investment advisory activities that do
not include the RR/RIA's "participation in the execution" would be subject to
Section 43. Id. For example, securities transactions effected by customers
through a broker-dealer or mutual fund even if based on specific
recommendations of the dually registered RR/RIA would be governed by Section
43, not Section 40. The NASD noted that Section 43, not Section 40, would apply
to those. Id. at 8. Similarly, RR/RIA's providing financial plans which do not
include specific securities purchase recommendations or executions or who
participate in a wrap-fee program where the transactions are not handled by the
RR/RIA. Id. at 9. "Some asset management firms offer 'wrap fee' programs to
registered investment advisers. The 'wrap fee' includes a fee for management,
accounting, and reporting. This fee is shared with the investment adviser who is
also a registered representative. Portfolio transactions are handled through a
broker-dealer firm at substantial discounts and are not known to or handled by
the RR/RIA. Investment advisers receive a part of the asset management fee
only and receive no part of any transaction fee. The adviser is registered with
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raises conflict of interest, disclosure and anti-fraud concerns, not
supervision and control.
IV. THE Possmmrrms OF DUALITY
There is no statutory prohibition against the same person registering as a broker-dealer and investment adviser with SEC7"
and/or serving as a registered representative of a broker-dealer
while also being independently registered as an investment
adviser. 74 This duality has been accepted by the industry and regulators for some time.
the Sec and any states as necessary. This activity would be subject to Section 43
rather than Section 40 of the Rules of Fair Practice." Id. Each adviser can
produce statements for clients based on downloaded information. The RR/RIA
receives a portion of the asset-based fee for his or her monitoring of the account.
The firm to which the account is referred actually handles all implementation,
and the dually registered person has no part in the actual transactions. These
third-party arrangements are covered by Section 43. Id. At 11. In each of the
foregoing, the RR/RIA did not receive compensation from the effecting of the
securities transaction nor handle, directly or indirectly, the execution of any
trade. By contrast, where the RR/RIA charged an advisory fee to "time" a group
of mutual funds and the exchange of funds was handled by the RR/RIA, the
NASD determined Section 40 would apply. Id. at 10. But see where "there are
firms offering market timing services where the firm, operating an independent
investment adviser, directs the switches within a family of mutual funds, either
load or no-load. There are no transaction charges and the investment adviser,
also a registered representative, is not involved in handling switches among
funds. The dually registered person does receive some part/percentage of the
market timing fee. If the customer or timing firm effects the switches with no
involvement by the RR/RIA, this fact pattern would be considered as falling
under Section 43." Id.
Section 43, not 40, applies so longs as the RR/RIA is not involved in
implementation or execution of the investment advice. Id. at 11. The issue or the
justification behind Section 40 is the NASD and SEC's view that "by engaging in
private securities transactions without [the broker-dealer's] knowledge, [a
registered representative] deprived his customers of the protection they were
entitled to expect." In the Matter of Gordon Westley Sodoroff, Jr., Exchange Act
Release No. 31334, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2190 at 23 (September 2, 1992). Similarly,
it has been held that "where [registered representatives] effect transactions for
customers outside the normal channels and without disclosure to the [firm], the
public is deprived the protection which it is entitled to expect." Anthony J.
Amato, 45 SEC. 282, 285 (1973). See also In the Matter of Terry Don Wamsganz,
Exchange Act Release No. 22411; 1985 SEC LEXIS 695 (Sept. 16, 1985) (citing
the foregoing approvingly).
73. See, e.g., Gordon Capital Management, SEC No-Action Letter, [1973
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,433 (July 5, 1993)..
74. See Financial Planning Service, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2522 at 2 (Aug.
20, 1984) where it was noted:
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Similarly, the duality of a registered representative also serving contemporaneously as: an associated person of an RIA; 75 an
RIA advisory representative, or an employee of a federal or state
banking or savings and loan association has also now been
accepted. 76 The key to the permitted duality of a registered representative also serving as an employee of a financial institution
appears to be the ongoing supervision and control to be exercised
by the broker-dealer over such a dual agent's performance of brokerage activities. This regulatory position is consistent with the
If you, as a financial planner not supervised by the broker-dealer for
whom you act as a registered representative, give advice more involved
than a mere discussion in general terms of the advisability of investing
in securities in the context of a discussion of economic matters or the
role of securities investments in a client's overall financial plan, or
discuss, more frequently than on rare and isolated instances, the
advisability of investing in, or issue reports or analyses as to, specific
securities or specific categories of securities (e.g., bonds, mutual funds,
technology stocks, etc.), you, or [the company], if you provide such advice
as an officer of [the company], would be required to be registered as an
investment adviser even if the compensation for such service is only (1)
a share, as a registered representative, of any brokerage commissions
paid by the client on the purchase of mutual fund shares or insurance
products that are deemed to be securities under the securities laws, or
(2) a share of the sales commissions paid by the client on insurance
products not deemed to be securities under the securities laws.
See also Financial Service Corp. Of America, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 80,017 (Oct. 9, 1974).
75. American Capital Equities, Inc., SEC No Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2328 (Apr. 13, 1987). But note that in American Capital Equities, Inc.,
the SEC could not assure enforcement action would not be recommended because
representatives of broker-dealer were also associated persons of RIA and
requested for tax-planning reasons that broker-dealer make all checks
representing all commissions earned by associated persons in their capacity as
representatives of the broker-dealer be made payable to the RIA rather than to
each individual representative; however, RIA retains significant portion of the
commission. Gordon Capital, SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
3088 (Jul. 3, 1973) and 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 85.
76. NASD Rule modeled after the SEC No-Act Letter, popularly referred to as
the Chubb letter, Chubb Securities Corp., SEC No Action Letter, 1993 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 1204 (Nov. 24, 1993); Laughlin Group Advisers, Inc, SEC No- Action
Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 361 (March 11, 1992); Standard Federal Bank
of Troy, Michigan, SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 640 (Aug. 10,
1995).
77. Laughlin Group Advisers, Inc., 1992 SEC No-Act LEXIS 361 and Chubb
Securities Corporation, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1204 (where CSC, a registered
broker-dealer, will exclusively control, supervise, and be responsible for all
securities business conducted in its locations at the financial institutions);
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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regulatory shibboleth and common sense! The permissibility of a
registered representative also acting as an RIA or associated person of an RIA, however, seems to hinge on the broker-dealer
supervising and controlling not only the brokerage activities, but
also the investment advisory activities of the registered representative.7 8 What can possibly rationalize limiting broker-dealer
supervision to brokerage activities in the former instance, but
expanding it in the latter? The foregoing non-broker-dealer type
activities, banking and investment advisory, are each subject to
separate regulation. Registration carries with it the responsibilities of compliance with the statute under which such registration
was obtained. No further supervision and control should be
required.
Muddying the regulatory waters even further is the inconsistency between SEC staff pronouncements when dealing with broker-dealer/financial institution networking arrangements on the
one hand, and RIA/financial institution networking arrangements
on the other. In the former, not only are such networking
arrangements permitted and broker-dealer supervision and control limited to brokerage activities, but no separate registration of
the financial institution is required under the 1934 Act. By conINVEST; SEC No Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1042 (Aug. 27, 1993);
Financial Network Investment Corporation, SEC No Action Letter, 1993 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 914 (Aug. 16, 1993); Bekhor Securities Corp. d/b/a First Affiliated
Securities, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 913 (Aug. 12, 1993);
Mid-Hudson Savings Bank FSB; Mid-Hudson Diversified Services, Inc., SEC NoAction Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 762 (May 28, 1993); Bankers Financial
Partners, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 704 (May 14,
1993); D.A. Davidson & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 371
(Mar. 1, 1993); Capital Securities Investment Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 138 (Feb. 3, 1993); UVEST Financial Services Group, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1082 (Nov. 24, 1992); American
General Securities Incorp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1252; Jefferson-Pilot Investor Services, Inc, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 2751 (Jul. 16, 1987); Brenner Steed, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1983 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1672 (Jan. 2, 1983). c.f Arkansas Federal Savings
Bank, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 707 (June 2, 1988)
(where SEC staff could not assure that enforcement action would not be
recommended to the SEC if Bank, broker-dealer, and RIA entered into a
"networking arrangement", whereby brokerage services would be provided to
customers of the bank through registered representatives of the broker-dealer
and not the broker-dealer itself.
78. An individual may be dually registered under the 1934 Act and Advisers
Act and a person may be an associated person of both a broker-dealer and
registered investment adviser.
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trast, when dealing with RIA/financial institution networking
arrangements, the SEC staff has insisted upon additional registration under the Advisers Act of the financial institution or, possibly, even the networking arrangement itself, because in these
networking arrangements the RIA was viewed as not having sole
control. 79 Sole control is not required in broker-dealer/financial
institution networking arrangements; why should it be required
in RIA/financial institution networking arrangements? Section
208(d) of the Advisers Act can not explain the difference since RIA
sole control is not required where the networking arrangement is
between an RIA and non-regulated entity, such as a publishing
house, or where a registered representative is an associated person of an RIA or separately registered him/herself as an RIA, each
as discussed below. Structural arrangements are understandably
closely scrutinized to ensure that the RIA is not merely a conduit
for advisory services being performed by personnel of an unregistered entity.80 1f registration and/or control are extant, however,
the regulatory shibboleth and Section 208(d) are satisfied and,
therefore, the regulatory focus should then shift to disclosure and
related anti-fraud concerns.
A brief overview of certain instances in which the SEC staff
has considered dual registration and/or persons acting as dual
agents as well as the conditions imposed by the SEC staff on structural arrangements, satisfaction of which is required, to garner
SEC staff favor illustrates the murkiness of the regulatory waters.
The shibboleth of registration or be an associated person, subject
to the supervision and control of the registered entity, is extant in
the SEC staffs construction in all of the foregoing instances. The
application and results, however, inexplicably differ depending
upon whether or not the RIA affiliation is with a broker-dealer,
financial institution or other entity. This regulatory inconsistency
muddies the regulatory focus.

79. See, e.g., First Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. of Rochester, SEC NoAction Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 48 (Jan. 19, 1989) and Laughlin Group
Advisers, Inc., 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 361; But see Kingland Capital, SEC NoAction Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 623 (Mar. 29, 1991).
80. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 353 (Dec. 18, 1972; 38 FR 1649,
Proposing Rule 202-1.
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Dual Registration
1. Being Both A Registered Broker-Dealer and Registered
Investment Adviser.

Consistent with the shibboleth, dual registration as an investment adviser and broker-dealer is clearly permitted."' Dual registration ensures that the respective regulated activity has
submitted and is being undertaken pursuant to the appropriate
regulations. Moreover, with dual registration, Section 208(d) is
honored, as no person is engaging indirectly in advisory activities
without proper registration.
Affiliated arrangements between a broker-dealer parent and
investment advisory subsidiary are also permitted.82 Indeed,
notwithstanding the usual control of corporate parent over its subsidiary, the broker-dealer parent was not even requir3d to register
under the Advisers Act.
2. Being Both A Registered Representative and A Registered
Investment Adviser.
(a) Natural Person Dually Registered.
Similarly, consistent with the shibboleth, there is no prohibition against one serving as a registered representative of a brokerdealer and also being individually and separately registered as an
investment adviser under the Advisers Act.8 3 Caveats to this
arrangement imposed by the SEC staff are: (i) "that the self-regulatory organization of which a broker-dealer is a member have no
objection to the proposed arrangement 84 ; and (ii) the brokerdealer (for whom the registered representative acts) would be
responsible for supervising the activities of the registered repre81. Wall Street Preferred Money Managers, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992
SEC No-Act LEXIS 648 (April 10, 1992); Hornor Townsend & Kent, Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1995 SEC No-Act LEXIS 495 (April 4, 1995). Moreover,
registration of corporate parent and or other corporate affiliates, one as a brokerdealer and the other as an investment advisers is similarly permitted. "Many
broker-dealers and registered representatives are also registered as investment
advisers." Regulation of Investment Advisers at 2-62.
82. F.S. Mosley, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 78,063.
83. It is not uncommon for registered representatives also to perform
investment advisory activities through their own separately incorporated RIA or
otherwise. Terwilliger, John, SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1769 at 2 (June 27, 1977); Gordon Capital Management, 1973 Fed. Sec. L. Rptr.
(CCH) 79,433.
84. Id.; Netti, Francis, L., 1976 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2816 (Nov. 29, 1976).
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sentative.8 5 At what point does broker-dealer supervision and
control of investment advisory services of its RR/RIA become the
broker-dealer rendering investment advisory services? 6 By this
supervision and control is the broker-dealer doing indirectly that
which is prohibited without that broker-dealer registering?
Clearly, this insistence by the SEC staff is inconsistent with (i) the
shibboleth; (ii) the acknowledged statutory distinctness in function between an investment adviser and broker-dealer; (iii) the
insistence by this same staff that the RIA exercise supervision and
control over advisory services; (iv) Section 208(d)'s prohibition
against doing indirectly what it could not do directly without
registration under the Advisers Act, namely, provide advisory service; (v) the separateness and independence between an RIA and
any affiliate insisted upon by the staff in other RIA structural
arrangements; and (vi) the fact that the Advisers Act does not 87contemplate supervision and control by a broker-dealer or SRO!

85. At one time, registered representatives had to obtain their broker-dealers
consent prior to registration as an investment adviser, as a matter of staff policy.
Elmer D. Robinson, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1610 at 2
(Jan. 6, 1986) (where the staff stated that although broker-dealer consent is "....
no longer require[d] .

.

. as a matter of policy,

. .

. contract law or other

considerations may dictate the same result.")
86. A general partner of a limited partnership was required to register under
the Advisers Act where that general partner had responsibility for the
partnership's investment advisory services. William M. Ryan, [1970-71 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 81, 507. But see Corbyn Associates, Inc. [197778 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 81,252.
87. Although the outside investment advisory activities of a registered
representative may be subject to NASD regulation, no similar SRO-imposed
regulation is extant for many other non-investment advisory outside business
activities of registered representative. See, e.g., Chubb Securities Corporation,
1993 SEC No. Act. LEXIS 1204 (1993). For example, the broker-dealer has no
authority to supervise and control the banking activities of its dually-employed
registered representatives. What then explains the extension of NASD oversight
to the investment advisory activities of its members' registered representatives?
Both activities, banking and investment advisory activities, are subject to
regulatory schemes, distinct from that of the broker-dealer activity. While
banking activities; however, seem to be exempt from the supervision and control
of NASD members, no similar exemption is extended for statutorily regulated
investment advisory activity. The NASD mandates through special
promulgation that its member broker-dealers supervise the investment activities
of its registered representatives who are also separately registered investment
advisers. Obviously, the rationale for the foregoing distinction in treatment
cannot be rationally attributed to the presence or absence of a separate
regulatory scheme. Rather the rationale behind this disparity in treatment of
NASD imposed oversight of broker-dealer/investment adviser relationships, but
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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How is it that networking arrangements involving dual
agents in the registered representative/financial institution
employee context do not require that the broker-dealer supervise
and control the financial institution activities of the dual agent?
In this latter context, all that is required is broker-dealer supervision and control over the brokerage activities of the dual agent,
registered representative/financial institution employee. Why are
not broker-dealer supervision and control responsibilities likewise
limited in the above-described RR/RIA contexts? The purported
SEC staff rationale for the expanded broker-dealer supervision
and control over the investment advisory activities of a duly registered representative and RIA is because of the difficulties of separating the functions of a broker-dealer firm from the investment
advisory activities of its registered representative.88 This is poppycock! The activities and functions of a broker-dealer and investment adviser, as envisioned by the statutory schemes of the 1934
Act and Advisers Act, have embraced the distinction and separateness in functions and the staff has acknowledged the same. 89
Requiring this involvement of the NASD and/or other SRO as
well as broker-dealer supervision and control over investment
advisory activities of a registered representative is not only inconsistent with the permissible lack of broker-dealer supervision and
control over financial institution activities of its dual agents, but
is also curious given the disparate statutory treatment of brokerdealer and investment advisory activities and lack of SRO mannot broker-dealer/banking relationships may better be explained by the SEC's
desire "ex cathedra" to do that which it has been unable to achieve legislatively.
"... supplement its own regulatory functions under the [Advisers] Act .... " ....
the Commission believes that self-regulation would provide a valuable
supplement to its own regulatory functions under the [Advisers] Act, and the

Commission desires and intends, if at all possible, to foster a self-regulatory
structure that would be both practicable and meaningful. Accordingly, one major
goal of the proposed study would be the development of appropriate incentives to
encourage voluntary participation in self-regulatory organizations." Legislation

To Amend Investment Advisers Act of 1940 proposed by Securities Exchange
Commission; Legislation to amend Investors Advisors Act of 1940 proposed by
Securities and Exchange Commission, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 491;

1975 SEC LEXIS 121 (Dec. 15, 1975). Terwillinger, John, 1977 SEC No-Act
LEXIS 1769 at 2; Westamerica Securities, Inc., 1974 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2219,
Netti, Francis L, 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2816; American Investors Co., 1075
SEC No-Act LEXIS 2102.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., F.S. Mosely [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rprt. (CCH)
78,063 (1970).
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dated under the Advisers Act. Under the Exchange Act, the
NASD is charged with regulating the conduct of its broker-dealer
members. 90 Broker-dealers are in the business of effecting securities transactions, not providing investment advice. 91 If a brokerdealer is not providing investment advice or registered as an
investment advisor, how can such a broker-dealer supervise one
who is? This SEC staff insistence on broker-dealer and NASD
jurisdiction could be viewed as nothing more than a veiled
attempt to impose supplementary oversight where none has been
Congressionally mandated; indeed, has been Congressionally
resisted.
(b)

Registered Representative Also Owner of Separately
IncorporatedRIA.

Rather than registering individually as an RIA under the
Advisers Act, a registered representative may also register his/her
separately incorporated entity under the Advisers Act. Again,
such dual registration is consistent with the shibboleth and Section 208(d) and, accordingly, should effect the investor protection
envisioned under the applicable federal securities laws. Notwithstanding this dual registration, however, the SEC staff has
insisted upon broker-dealer supervision and control even over the
RR and his/her separately incorporated RIA. 92 Such insistence is
inconsistent with the shibboleth, register or be subject to the
supervision and control of the registered entity and the statutory
schemes of the 1934 Act and Advisers Act. Broker-dealer supervision and control is not required; it muddies the regulatory waters.
Indeed, this same staff insists upon separateness and independence in other structural and/or networking arrangements. Why
should not the same separateness and independence between an
RR and his/her RIA insulate the RIA from SEC staff concern? The
SEC staff has confused disclosure/anti-fraud concerns with supervision and control issues. This is not to say that the staff has pro90. NASD Rules of Fair Practice are designed to protect investors and to
promote just and equitable rules of trade.
91. Indeed, if broker-dealers do provide investment advice other than on an
incidental basis, these broker-dealers must also register as investment advisers.
Moreover, a registered broker-dealer networking with an RIA who receives a

portion of the advisory fee must register under the Advisers Act. Reinholdt &
Gardner, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 78, 120 (1971).
92. But see the distinction between Article III NASD Rules of Fair Practice
Sections 40 and 43.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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hibited structural arrangements where a registered
representative also owned a separately incorporated RIA. Indeed,
although the contemplated fee arrangement was questioned, the
structural arrangement between a registered broker-dealer and a
registered investment adviser, all of whose officers, directors,
shareholders and employees were also registered representatives
of the registered broker-dealer was not questioned. 93 This is surprising given the assertion in this no-action request that the broker-dealer . . . assumes no supervisory responsibility over the

financial advisory activities94 of the RIA. The SEC staff, however,
has questioned a like characterization of a division of responsibilities made in another no-action request where a registered representative of a broker-dealer also owned a separately incorporated
RIA. There the representative had suggested that he would be
solely responsible for the investment advisory activities of his separately incorporated RIA while his broker-dealer would be responsible only for supervising his RR's securities activities effected
through the broker-dealer. 95 In response to that characterization,
the SEC noted that Article III, Section 40, of NASD's Rules of Fair
Practice and its requirement that the broker is required to supervise any transaction for which its representative receives selling
compensation and participates in the execution of the trade. 96
These latter NASD Section 40 terms selling compensation and private securities transaction facially, at least, appear tied to, and
are consistent with, the 1934 Act's definition of a broker-dealer
which is tied to effecting securities transactions. These terms,
however, have consistently been expanded. Indeed, now, the foregoing term selling compensation forms the basis for the NASD's
assertion of jurisdiction over the investment advisory activities of
registered representatives.97 Why should the investment advisory
93. The fee arrangement by which the registered broker-dealer proposed to
pay all commission earned by the registered representatives by checks made
payable to the RIA affiliate of these registered representatives, however, was

questioned. The staff opined that this payment arrangement would necessitate
broker-dealer registration of the RIA. American Capital Equities, Inc., 1987
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2328 (May 15, 1987).

94. Id.
95. Hornor Townsend & Kent, Inc., 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495 at 5 (April
4, 1995).
96. Id. Netti, Francis, L., 1976 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2816 (November 29, 1976).
97. The NASD had issued two notices to members, #91-32 (June, 1991) and
#94-44 (May, 1994), discussing when a broker is obligated to supervise activities
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997
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fee governed by the Advisers Act trigger 1934 Act concerns?9"
What if the investment advisory activities of the RR/RIA or RR/
associated person's RIA result neither in any securities transactions being effected through the RR's broker-dealer nor, indeed, in
any securities transactions being effected?
Although there may be a basis for a broker-dealer employer to
prohibit or prescribe by contract conditions under which its registered representative may engage in non-broker-dealer activities,
there should not be any basis for suggesting that broker-dealers
are statutorily required or permitted to exercise supervision and
control over an RIA and the conduct of its RIA business. Moreover, the suggestion rejected by the SEC staff that the RIA be
solely responsible for the investment advisory activities of his separately incorporated RIA is precisely what this same staff insists
upon in other contexts. 99 And, typically, to assert supervision and
control, one must be an associated person which the staff has suggested is not typically extant with respect to an unrelated
corporation.1 0 0
Clearly, the concern about registered representatives acting
contemporaneously for, and on behalf of, another person is understandable. However, this concern should be ameliorated, if not
eliminated, whenever the registered representative is acting also
as an associated person of a separately incorporated RIA owned by
him/her or is him/herself registered as an investment adviser.
The regulatory scheme of the Advisers Act should provide the requisite investor protection mandated by Congress over the investment advisory activities and the regulatory scheme of the 1934
Act, as supplemented by the NASD Rules of Fair Practice and/or

of its representatives that are outside the scope of the representatives
employment with the broker.
98. Receipt of any portion of the advisory fee by the broker-dealer, on the

other hand, is of concern and may trigger the requirement of registration under
the Advisers Act for that broker-dealer.
99. See, e.g., proposed Rule 202.
100. Thomas A. Busson, 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1874 (Aug. 27, 1976).
Obviously, RR/RIA instances may involve a relationship between the brokerdealer and the RIA, but the RIA and broker-dealer in these instances are
unrelated in terms of stock ownership and interlocking deputized officers and
directors.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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otherwise101, should provide ample investor protection for the brokerage function.
3. Muddled Regulatory Thinking Exposed
Broker-dealer supervision and control over the investment
advisory activities of the person dually registered as the brokerdealer's registered representative and separately, registered as an
RIA, individually or through his/her separately incorporated
entity is required. Where the RR is not dually registered as a registered representative and RIA, however, but rather acts as an RR
and associated person or advisory representative of an RIA (not
owned by the RR) RIA, not broker-dealer, supervision and control
over the performance of investment advisory services is insisted
upon. This clearly exposes muddled regulatory thinking! In the
former instance (RR/RIA), the RR is actually registered under the
Advisers Act, while in the latter, is not. In the latter instance,
unlike instances involving a dually registered RR/RIA, but consistent with the shibboleth and the statutory scheme, RIA supervision and control is required, not broker-dealer supervision and
control over RIA activities. Say what!
B. Dual Agent.
1. Registered Representative Also Acting As An Advisory
and/or Being An Associated Person of
Representative
RIA10 2
The Commission staff in 1975 permitted registered representatives of a broker-dealer to refer clients to an RIA affiliate and
receive a referral fee without separately registering under the
Advisers Act.' 0 3 In so doing, however, the staff conditioned its
permissive view on the RIA controlling the marketing activities
101. It is also important to note that Article III, Section 1 of the NASD's Rules
of Fair Practice require the observation of high standards of commercial honor
and just and equitable principles of trade.
102. American Capital Equities, Inc., 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2328 (May 15,

1983) (where SEC could not assure enforcement action would not be
recommended because representatives of broker-dealer were also associated

persons of RIA and requested for tax-planning reasons that broker-dealer make
all checks representing all commissions earned by associated persons in their
capacity as representatives of the broker-dealer payable to the RIA rather than
to each individual representative; however, RIA retains significant portion of
commission).

103. See, eg., Bonnie Mae White, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No.
31799, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 1362, 1993 SEC LEXIS 184
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associated with this referral arrangement; and an acknowledgment that the registered representatives participating in this
referral arrangement were associated persons, of the RIA, subject
to the supervision
and control of the RIA with respect to those
4
0
activities.'

Interestingly, here the duality of being a registered representative/advisory representative, consistent with the shibboleth,
triggered the supervision and control by the RIA. Presumably,
this also means that here the employer broker-dealer's supervision and control is limited to brokerage activities. This would
make sense, and would be consistent with the shibboleth and Section 208(d) but inconsistent with the staffs rejection of a like posi0 5
tion asserted in Hornor Townsend & Kent, Inc. noted earlier.1
There an RIA unsuccessfully asserted that it would be solely
responsible for investment advisory activities while the brokerdealer employer of its principal would be responsible for brokerage
activities engaged in by the registered representative principal.' 06
SEC insistence on RIA control over its associated persons is logical and consistent with the Advisers Act. SEC insistence, however, on broker-dealer control over RIA associated persons defies
logic and is inconsistent with Section 208(d) and the general
scheme of the Advisers Act and the regulatory shibboleth. How
can the SEC insist on broker-dealer supervision over the investment advisory activities of a registered representative who performs those advisory services on behalf of an RIA?

(Feb. 1, 1993). Investors Diversified Services, Inc. and IDS Advisory Corp., 1975
SEC No-Act Leis 1800 (Sept. 7, 1975).
104. We would not recommend that the Commission take any action if
registered representatives of IDS do not register individually as investment
advisers under the Act if you acknowledge that, for purposes of the Act, (1)
IDSAC controls the activities of IDS Marketing and the registered
representatives in soliciting Potential Accounts in a manner which makes them
associated persons of IDSAC within the meaning of Section 202(a) (17) of the act;
(2) such registered representatives are advisory representatives within the
meaning of Rule 204-2(a) (12) under the Act; and (3) IDS Marketing and the
participating registered representatives will fulfill the same obligations of
IDSAC toward IDSAC's present and prospective investment advisory clients.
Investor Diversified Services, Inc. and IDS Advisory Corp., 1975 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1800 (Sept. 7, 1975).
105. Hornor Townsend & Kent, Inc., 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495 at 5 (April
4, 1995).
106. Id.
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2. Networking Arrangements Between RIA and Others.
As the shibboleth suggests, registration and control are inextricably linked. Whenever one performs investment advisory
services or receives compensation from investment advisory activities, one must either be registered as an investment adviser or 10be7
an associated person of the RIA, subject to control by that RIA.
As noted earlier, however, supplementary broker-dealer supervision and control in some instances is staff imposed, making this
shibboleth a hollow truth!'08 Moreover, no registration under the
Advisers Act may be required of that broker-dealer, 0 9 while registration under the Advisers Act is required in RIA-financial institution networking arrangements. Consistency may be the hobgoblin
of little minds and statesmen, but regulatory inconsistency of this
magnitude muddies the regulatory waters and results in uneven
regulation and inconsistent protection of investors.
(a) Non-Financial Institution I Non-Broker-Dealer
Networking Arrangements.
Consistent with the regulatory shibboleth, control by the RIA
over the investment advisory activities of a dual agent, acting as
an associated person of the RIA and an employee of an unrelated
publishing house obviated the need for Advisors Act registration.
Employees of Commerce Clearing House, Inc. ("CCH") engaged in
marketing type activities connected with selling the publication of
a registered investment adviser, Evaluation Associates, Inc., were
not required to separately register under the Advisers Act. 0 The
staff based its permissive view on the basis of: (i) the RIA's representation of its right to, and its actual exercise of "direct control
with respect to sales of its publication.. ."11' and; (ii) the fact that
all those CCH employees participating in this sales effort would,
according to the staff, be associated persons of EAI subject to
107. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2863 (July 21,
1976).

108. See, e.g., Honor Townsend & Kent, Inc., SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495 (April 4,
1995).
109. F.S. Mosley, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 78,063.
110. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2863 (Jul. 21,
1976).
111. "Based on... a representation that . . . [EAI] a registered investment

adviser, will have the right to, and will in fact exercise, direct control with
respect to sales of its publication, we would not recommend that the Commission

take any action under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.. .against EAI or the
employees of [CCH]... if such CCH employees do not register under the Act." Id.
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EA's supervision and control "with a view to preventing violations of the federal securities laws in connection with their activities on behalf of EAI...,* (Emphasis added). This holding is
consistent with the shibboleth, register or be an associated person
under the control of RIA, as well as with the staff holding that the
RIA, not the broker-dealer, exercises supervision and control over
the investment advisory activities of that RIA's associated person
contemporaneously acting as a registered representative discussed above. Moreover, this holding is of note on two additional
scores: (i) these dual CCH employees/ RIA associated persons
were not under the sole control of the RIA although that has been
required by the SEC in other contextsand (ii) no additional layer
of supervision and control or SRO oversight was extant as is presently required whenever the duality involves a broker-dealer's
registered representative who is also an RIA, whether individually or through a separately incorporated entity.
Shortly after issuance of the CCH No-Action letter referenced
above, the staff declined to issue a no-action letter under similar,
but possibly dispositively different, circumstances. 113 Flow of
Money, Inc., a registered investment adviser ("FOM"), provided a
statistical service. FOM proposed to enter into an arrangement
with an unrelated corporation which would provide sales services
in marketing FOM's service. The SEC staff emphasized two
points: (i) any person receiving compensation for selling an advisory publication would normally be required to register... unless
it is an associated person, and subject to the supervision and control, of a registered investment adviser, either as an employee or
otherwise;" 4 and (ii) [als a general matter, we would not regard a
corporation as an associated person of an unrelated corporation." 5 Accordingly, this unrelated corporation would either have
to register separately as an investment adviser or establish sufficient facts showing how it is an associated person of FOM. Here,
the SEC adheres to the shibboleth register or be an associated person under the control and supervision of an RIA, but as discussed
above and below, waivers in other RIA networking relationships.
Why does this shibboleth breakdown: when the relationship is
112. Id. Moreover, the staff noted that failure reasonably to supervise could
subject EAI and/or its supervisory personnel to sanctions under Section 203(e)(5)

of the Advisers Act (Id.)
113. Thomas A. Busson, 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1874 (Aug. 27, 1976).

114. Id. at 1.
115. Id.
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between a broker-dealer and a registered representative who is
also separately registered as an investment adviser, individually
or through a separately incorporated entity or when the relationship is between an RIA and a financial institution? How is any
regulatory scheme thwarted if investment advisory activities are
conducted by a registered investment adviser, exercising supervision and control over its associated persons' conduct of investment
advisory activities pursuant to the provisions of the Advisers Act?
(b)

RIA / FinancialInstitution Networking Arrangements.

Further evidence of regulatory muddled thinking and the hollowness of the shibboleth: register or be an RIA associated person
under supervision and control of an RIA, is the SEC staff insistence in First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Rochester
(First Federal)11 6 on Advisers Act registration notwithstanding
the RIA's assertion of supervision and control. The foregoing
together with the assurance that certain joint employees would be
associated persons of an RIA (i.e., subject to the supervision and
control of the RIA) was not enough. The SEC staff, nonetheless,
insisted that registration under the Advisers Act was required by
one or more of: First Federal Savings and Loan Association of
Rochester (First Federal); its service corporation subsidiary, First
Diversified Financial Services, Inc. (Service Corporation;) or the
contemplated networking arrangement between the Service Corporation and New England Financial Advisors, Inc. (NEFA), a
registered investment adviser. Under this contemplated networking arrangement, NEFA would offer financial planning services to
customers of First Federal and Service Corporation, using Service
Corporation employees ("Joint Employees").
In considering whether or not registration of Service Corporation, First Federal and/or the Service Corporation/NEFA networking arrangement itself was required, the staff noted that the issue
was "whether the advisory activities of the Joint Employees would
be performed solely under the control of NEFA, such that the
Joint Employees would be considered associated persons only of
NEFA" (Emphasis added).1 1 7 If not solely an associated person of
NEFA, registration would be required according to the SEC
116. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 48 (Jan.
19, 1989).

117. Id. at 2-3.
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staff."" Neither sole control nor sole associated person status,
however, was required in the non-financial institution/RIA
networking arrangement 1 9 or in a broker-dealer/RIA arrangements summarized above.
In First Federal, the staff found that the Joint Employees
were "not only associated persons of NEFA but also of Service Corporation and, possibly, First Federal." 120 This characterization by

the staff seems tied to two (2) factors concerning the Service Corporation Joint Employees. These Joint Employees would be (i)
providing investment advice not only to their customers, but also
to the general public; and (ii) receiving incentive based compensation from Service Corporation.' 2 ' These two (2) factors suggested
to the staff that Service Corporation and/or First Federal "would
be engaged in the business of advising others." 22 Moreover, simply because neither the Service Corporation nor First Federal
received the advisory fee directly from an advisory client was not
determinative in deciding whether or not either or both was
engaged in the business of advising others. 23 That is, these Joint
Employees, although associated persons and, therefore, under the
control of NEFA with respect to Service Corporation customers,
were also associated persons of the Service Corporation to the
extent their investment advisory services were being performed
on behalf of the Service Corporation.124
118. If the Joint Employee is not an associated person only if NEFA,)".
either First Federal, Service Corporation, or the Networking Arrangement
itself... may be deemed investment advisers..." Id. at 3.
119. See, e.g., Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2863
(July 21, 1976).
120. First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 48 at 4.
121. Id..
122. Id. Section 202(a)(11) defines an investment adviser as one who is
engaged in the business of advising others. - Receipt of incentive based
compensation in the broker-dealer bank networking arrangements, however, is
not dispositive. See also Kingland Capital, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 623 (March
29, 1991).
123. "... in order to satisfy the compensation element of the definition of an
investment adviser, it is not necessary that investment adviser's compensation
be paid directly by the person receiving investment advisory services, but only
that the investment adviser receive compensation from some source for his
services" First Federal Savings and Loan Assoc., at 5 n.6, (citing Investment
Advisers Act Rel. No. 1092 (Oct. 8, 1987)).
124. In the context of Section 202(aX17), a person can be considered under the
control of another person if investment advisory services are performed by that
person on behalf of, and under the supervision or oversight of, the other person.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5
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The applicant in NEFA analogized the proposed RIA/financial
institution networking arrangement to the accepted networking
arrangements between registered broker-dealers and financial
institutions.125 Notwithstanding NEFA's assurance that:
(i) NEFA, not First Federal or Service Corporation, would be
providing all investment advisory services under the Networking
Arrangement;

126

(ii) all Joint Employees engaged in investment advisory services would be subject to the authority and supervision of NEFA
with regard to the federal securities laws; 127 and
(iii) all investment advisory
activities would be segregated
128
from First Federal activities,

First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n 1989 SEC No-Act. Lexis 48 at 3. See also
Corrine E. Wood, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2028 (April 17, 1986).
125. "The Commissions' staff has granted numerous no-action positions
relating to networking arrangements between a broker-dealer and a service
corporation of a savings and loan association where, as here, brokerage services
are to be provided by a registered broker-dealer, all persons engaged in securities
activities will be fully subject to the statutory and regulatory requirements of the
federal securities laws and the applicable rules of the self-regulatory
organizations, and the brokerage activities will be significantly segregated from
the activities of the savings and loan association." For examples of permissible
broker-dealer bank networking arrangements (i.e., no broker-dealer registration
required of participating financial institution). See, e.g., Savings Ass'n
Investment Securities, Inc., 1982 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2620 (July 8, 1982);
Brenner Steed, Inc., 1983 SEC No-Act LEXIS 1672 (Jan. 2, 1983); Poughkeepsie
Savings Bank, 1983 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2316 (April 23, 1983); Fortune Federal
Savings and Loan Ass'n, 1983 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2501 (May 20, 1983); Standard
Federal Savings and Loan Association of Troy, 1984 SEC No-Act LEXIS (April
16, 1984); National Equity Securities Corp., 1984 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2454 (June
16, 1984); Investment Bankers and Brokers, Inc, 1984 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2826
(Oct. 11, 1984); Columbia Savings, 1986 SEC No-Act LEXIS 1710 (Jan. 9, 1986);
Marketing One Securities, Inc., 1986 SEC No-Act LEXIS 3120 (Aug. 7, 1986);
Central Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 1987 SEC No-Act LEXIS 1769 (Jan. 31,
1987); International Financial Services Capital Corp., 1987 SEC No-Act LEXIS
1847 (Feb. 9, 1987); Jefferson-Pilot Investor Services Inc., 1987 SEC No-Act
LEXIS 2751 (July 16, 1987); Arkansas Federal Savings Bank, 1988 SEC No-Act
LEXIS 707 (June 2, 1988); Landmark Securities, Inc.; 1988 SEC No-Act LEXIS
1539 (No. 1, 1988); Penn Mutual Equity Services, Inc., 1989 SEC No-Act LEXIS
242 (Feb. 7, 1989); Franklin Federal Bancorp., 1989 SEC No-Act LEXIS 1100
(Nov. 6, 1989); Albany Savings Bank, 1990 SEC No-Act LEXIS 1027; Southern
National Corp., 1991 SEC No-Act LEXIS 334 (Feb. 19, 1991); Laughlin Group
Advisers, Inc., 1992 SEC No-Act LEXIS 361 (Mar. 11, 1992).
126. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 1989 SEC No-Act. LXIS 48 at 22.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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the SEC staff opined that registration was required by one or
more of the Service Corporation, First Federal and/or the
networking arrangement. 129 Query why compliance with the
above in the context of broker-dealer/financial institution
networking arrangements obviates separate registration under
the 1934 Act, but does not obviate registration under the Advisers
Act? Why isn't NEFA's Advisers Act registration and its compliance with the federal securities laws, including supervising and
controlling the advisory activities of its associated person/Joint
Employees, sufficient to protect the public and satisfy the purposes of the Advisers Act.?" °
How can advisory activities under the control of the RIA also
be attributed by the SEC staff to the other employer? 13 1 It does
not seem enough under First Federal's rationale that the advisory
activities be under the sole control of the RIA. 13 2 This is not
always so! Sole and exclusive control over all activities of a dual
agent is not required in either the broker-dealer/financial institution networking context nor in the broker-dealer/dual registered
RR/RIA. Clearly, the concern for the public and that all personnel
engaged in securities activities will be fully subject to the regulatory requirements of the federal securities laws and rules of selfregulatory organizations 1 3 3 is the same, no matter the context.
129. No registration was required, however, in a networking arrangement

between a service corporation broker-dealer, Columbia Securities Corp. ("CSC")
and its affiliate Columbia Savings, A Federal Savings and Loan Assoc., pursuant
to which CSC provided incidental advisory services to the customers of Columbia
Savings. Columbia Savings, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS at 1 and 28 (Jan. 9, 1986).
130. Id. The applicant in Laughlin Group Advisers, Ina referred to the staff's
refusal to grant a no-action position in First Federal Savings and Loan Assoc.
and suggested the justification for same was that ". . . the Staff could not
conclude that the advisory activities were under the sole control of the registered
investment adviser. As a result, the staff appeared unable to conclude that the
investment advisory services provided by the dual employee were provided solely
on behalf of and under the supervision of the registered investment advisor."
(Emphasis added). Laughlin Group Advisors, Inc., 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 361
at 21.
131. Note, attribution was not required in Laughlin Group Advisers, Inc.:
"Control with respect to such activities would lie solely with LGA. Therefore, we
do not believe it is appropriate to attribute these advisory activities to the
Participant." Id. 121.
132. Why in an RIA/bank networking arrangement, are the advisory activities
deemed to be conducted not only on behalf of the RIA, but also the bank under
the networking arrangement? But see Kingland Capital, 1991 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 623 (March 29, 1991).
133. Laughlin Group Advisers, Inc, 1992 SEC No-Act LEXIS 361 at 2.
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Indeed, this concern is the very basis of the regulatory shibboleth:
register or be an associated person subject to the supervision and
control of the registered entity. How can this concern be met without requiring additional registration under the 1934 Act, involving networking arrangements between broker-dealers and
financial institutions, but rather relying on the registered brokerdealer simply exercising supervision and control over the brokerage activities of the joint employee/dual agent,13 4 but only met
with additional registration under the Advisers Act in RIA/financial institution networking arrangements? 13 5 Further, what different, albeit incomprehensible, rationale seems to compel the
staff to hold differently in the contexts of broker-dealer and dually
registered RR/RIA arrangements?
Surprisingly, in a subsequent no-action letter, Kingland Cap3
ital 6 , the staff appears to have taken a position at variance with
the First Federal described above. As with First Federal, Kingland Capital Corporation (Kingland Capital), a registered investment adviser, proposed to enter into a networking arrangement
with commercial banks. Under this arrangement, Kingland Capital would provide financial plans to bank customers and share the
fee with the bank. In acquiescing to non-registration, the staff
stated:
Notwithstanding the staff s statement in [First Federal]... that
the networking arrangement itself could be required to register as
an investment adviser, we believe that, as a general matter, registration of a networking arrangement is unnecessary where the
registered [investment] adviser is responsible for the networking
arrangement and supervises all employees of the organizations
37
that provide services on behalf of the networking arrangement. 1
The difference in result cannot be explained by the representations in Kingland Capital that: (1) the only responsibility of the
bank would be to compensate the dual employee; and (2) the RIA,
Kingland Capital, would have all responsibility for the activities
of dual employees. 138 There was a like representation in First
Federal that [A]ll activities of Joint Employees which in any way
134. See, e.g., id.
135. See, e.g., Laughlin Group Advisors, Inc. where no registration as a brokerdealer was required of joint employees and/or the financial institution in a
networking arrangement, but where no similar non-registration.
136. Kingland Capital, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS.
137. Id. at 3.
138. Id. at 2.
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relate ... to the sale of financial planning services will be supervised by... [the RIA] NEFA' 9 and that First Federal and/or the
Service Corp. would compensate the dual employee. 140 Moreover,
unlike First Federal, the staff does not require that the dual
employee be solely associated 14 1 with the RIA, Kingland Capital.
3.

Being Both a Registered Investment Adviser And An
Associated Person Of Another Registered Investment
Adviser.

In a situation where an individual is both separately registered as an investment adviser and an associated person of
another investment adviser, the staff has cautioned that issues
under Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act" 2 may arise.143 This is
so because of the possible confusion in a client's mind as to who is
performing the advisory activities.44 The issue here is recognized
as not involving registration or control, but rather anti-fraud concerns, which are typically addressed under the federal securities
laws by disclosure.
Accordingly, if the dual agent "provides investment advice
solely within the scope of his employment"" 5 , for the other registered investment adviser and this is clearly disclosed to the client
and in disclosure statements, no misrepresentation is likely, and,
thus, no violation of Section 206(4) should lie. Similarly, disclosure and anti-fraud concerns, not broker-dealer supervision and
control, should be the issue focused upon whenever an RR contemporaneously acts as an RIA, whether individually or through his/
her separately incorporated entity and disclosure and anti-fraud
concerns, not RIA sole control should be the regulatory focus when
the RIA networks with a financial institution or other entity.
139. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 1989 SEC No-Act LEXIS 48 at 20.
140. Id. at 4.
141. 'The issue presented is whether the advisory activities of the Joint
Employees would be performed solely under the control of NEFA, such that the
Joint Employees would be considered associated persons only of NEFA." Id. at 2-

3.
142. Section 206(4) prohibits an investment adviser from engaging in
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts, practices or courses of business.
143. Corinne E. Wood, 1986 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2028 (April 17, 1986).

144. Id. at 3.
145. Id. at 4.
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REGULATORY SHIBBOLETH AND SECTION 208(D):

Taken together, the registration concerns of Section 203 and
the prohibitions of Section 208(d) raise concerns about "structural
arrangements in which a registered investment adviser is merely
a conduit for advisory services provided by personnel of an unregistered affiliate." 146 Stated differently, the issue is whether or not
the unregistered entity is engaging indirectly in activities that
would require it to register if engaged in directly, in violation of
Section 208(d). 147 The foregoing Section 208(d), however, does
not prohibit separate entities engaged in different activities from
being related by stock ownership or otherwise. 148 So long as the
regulated activities are conducted pursuant to the Advisers Act
and the regulatory shibboleth, the relationship between the separate entities does not thwart the regulatory scheme. And to
ensure the relationship does not result in the unregistered entity
conducting advisory services, the Commission has insisted upon
establishing the separateness
and independence of unregistered
49
RIA.1
an
of
affiliates
If independence and separateness are the basis for permitting
unregistered RIA affiliates, why does not this same criteria of
independence and separateness provide the basis for permitting
networking arrangements between RIA and a financial institution
or other affiliate or non-affiliate? So long as the entity rendering
the investment advisory services is registered under the Advisers
Act and, if any persons who act both for the RIA and the nonregistered is an RIA associated person with respect to such person's investment advisory activities, the goals of the Advisers Act
are ensured and both the provisions of Section 208(d) and the reg146. Ropes & Gray, 1995 SEC No-Act LEXIS 748 at 4 (Sept. 26, 1995).
147. Id. at 4.
148. The SEC has acknowledged "valid business reasons for a company to form
a separate registered entity." Ropes & Gray at 5.
149. See, e.g., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 353 (Dec. 18, 1972), 38 FR
1649 (proposing Rule 202-1 under the Advisers Act. Under the proposed Rule, a
registered entity would have been deemed separate from its unregistered
affiliate if the registrant met the following conditions: "(1) it had a majority of
directors that was independent of the controlling entity or its affiliate; (2) it was
adequately capitalized; (3) its officers were independent of the controlling entity
or its affiliates; (4) its advisory representatives were independent of the
controlling entity or its affiliate and made recommendations independent from
such persons; and (5) it did not use advice from the controlling entity or its
affiliates other than statistical and factual information." This Rule was
withdrawn in Investment Advisers Act Rel. No. 497 (Feb. 19, 1976).
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ulatory shibboleth are honored. There is no lack of policing.'15 No
advisory activities take place outside of the Commission's jurisdiction and, for that reason, there is no concern that an unregistered
affiliate would be engaging in activities that would (1) require it to
register under the Advisers Act, or (2) adversely affect the registrant's advisory client. 151 Further, so long as the unregistered

affiliate does not conduct investment advisory activities outside
the scope of its activities for the RIA152 no intolerable danger
persists.
Based upon the foregoing rationale, the SEC staff recently did

not require registration of various general partners and other
affiliates to registered investment advisers partnerships 153 stating that:
"The concerns underlying the conditions of proposed Rule 202-1
. . . and Section 208(d) of the Advisers Act, are adequately
addressed when (i) the unregistered affiliate of a registered
adviser does not provide investment advice; (ii) the unregistered
affiliate and each of its employees are deemed associated persons

of the [RIA] when they have access to the investment recommendations of the [RIA] or information concerning the recommendations prior to the effective dissemination of the recommendations;

and (iii) the Commission has access to the unregistered affiliates
books and records to the extent necessary to examine the business
of the registered adviser.'
(Emphasis added).

The Big Eight accounting firm, Arthur Andersen & Co. (AA)
was permitted to establish Arthur Andersen Financial Advisers
(AAFA), a registered investment adviser, without requiring the

additional registration of AA under the Advisers Act. 155 Under
this arrangement not only was AA a general partner of AAFA, but
the advisory board 56 governing AAFA was comprised of seven or
more partners, principals and managers of AA. Further, AA
150. One concern previously expressed by the Commission was structural
arrangements between RIA and their unregistered affiliate because "these
arrangements make difficult for the Commission to police conduct that may
harm clients of the registered adviser." Ropes & Gray, 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
748 at 2.
151. Id. at 7-8.
152. Id. at 10.
153. Id. at 12.
154. Id. at 12.
155. Arthur Andersen & Co., 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 617 at 5 (July 8, 1994).
156. This advisory board "will establish, and supervise compliance with,
policies regarding the scope and content of any investment advice rendered by
[AA] personnel in the course of providing personal financial planning or
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/5

56

1997]

Finneran: Investment Advisory Regulatory Muddy Waters: Registration and Con
REGISTRATION AND CONTROL ISSUES

405

stated that AA would provide subject to AAFA's supervision,
investment consulting services to clients, including employee benefit plans, relating to asset allocation, portfolio diversification,
managing portfolio risk...7 [and] will, if a client desires, identify categories of mutual funds that satisfy the client's investment
objectives.... 5 8 In permitting this arrangement without requiring [registration under the Advisers Act, the staff noted its reliance 159 on AA assurance that [AA] personnel who provide
investment advice in connection with personal financial planning
or employee benefit consulting services or hold themselves out as
providing these services [would] be deemed to be advisory affiliates and persons associated with an investment adviser for purposes of ... the Advisers Act.16 0 The foregoing staff position is of
interest for two reasons, both of which expose the inconsistency in
staff reasoning. 1 61 First, the staff insists on AA personnel rendering investment advice to be treated as associated persons of
AAFA, 162 while earlier in this same no-action request approvingly
noting AA's representation that its recommendations would be
"part of the traditional accounting services generally rendered by
certified public accountants and are consistent with the exception
to the definition of investment adviser in Section 202(a)(11)(B) of
the Advisers Act."163 Second, this holding exposes the staff inconsistency on whether RIA sole control over all activities or only
investment advisory activities is required. Sole control over personnel rendering investment advice was insisted upon by the staff
in First Federal, but was not equally compelling in this instance.
employee benefit plan consulting services to [AA] clients." Id. at 2 (emphasis

added).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 5-6.
160. Id. at 6.
161. What makes the SEC permissive view in this instance even more
surprising is the fact that AA also indicated that it might also recommend the
purchase or sale of specific securities in certain instances. AA assured the SEC
staff, however, that these recommendations would be driven by tax or estate
planning considerations and would be "part of the traditional accounting services
generally rendered by certified public accountants and are consistent with the
exception to the definition of investment adviser in Section 202(a)(11)(B) of the
Advisers Act." Id. at 3.
162. Id. at 7 n.3, where staff noted that "[tihose persons who exclusively
provide investment advice in reliance on Section 202(a)(11)(B) of the Advisers
Act would not be considered associated persons of AAFA."
163. Id. at 3.
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Why is the finding of sole RIA control dispositive in some
instances, but not in others?16 4 What makes this distinction more
surprising is the fact that the AA/AAFA arrangement was one
between affiliates and the First Federal instance was between
non-affiliates. One might think that a networking arrangement
between affiliates' 65would be more problematic than between nonaffiliates, but apparently not, as evidenced by the disparity in regulatory thinking between the staff holdings in First Federal 166
and AA/AAFA.
164. See Commerce Clearing House, Inc, 1976 SEC No-Act LEXIS 2863 (July
21, 1976) where the SEC accepted RIA control over only the investment advisory
activities ofjoint employees. Koyen, Clarke & Associates, Inc., 1986 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2882 (November 10, 1986), solicitors for Koyen, Clarke & Associates, Inc.,
a registered investment adviser, were not required to register separately as
investment advisers, notwithstanding the receipt of compensation received
indirectly from the sale of advisory services. The lack of need for registration
was based upon assurance that the solicitors would comply with the cash
solicitation rule under the Advisers Act and that the solicitors... will be at least
with respect to those [solicitation] activities, an associated person of the
investment adviser and therefore will not be required to register individually
under the Advisers Act solely as a result of those activities. Id. at 2-3.
(Emphasis added). But see Thomas A. Busson, 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1874.
(August 27, 1976) where the staff opined that receipt of compensation for selling
advisory services normally triggered the registration requirements under the
Advisers Act. See also Rule 206(4)-3(a)(2)(iii); Koyen, Clarke & Associates, Inc.,
1986 SEC No-Act LEXIS citing Investment Advisers Act Rel. No. 688 (July 12,
1979); Hornor Townsend & Kent, Inc., SEC No-Act LEXIS 495 (April 4, 1995)
where the SEC staff questioned the assertion of sole control over a dual agent
who was a registered representative/RIA. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n,
1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 48 (Jan. 19, 1989) where the SEC staff insisted on RIA
sole control over joint employees. But see, Kingland Capital, 1991 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 623 (March 29, 1991).
165. Arthur Anderson & Co., 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 617 at 31-32. AA in its
request for no-action noted that:
Traditionally, the SEC staff has been concerned that a parent company
may engage in the investment advisory business by operating a
controlled entity to avoid registration under the Advisers Act. In the
staffs view, such a situation may give rise to abuses, including, among
other things, the possibility that the affiliate might be an
undercapitalized shell organized to limit the parent's liability or that
the affiliate might be used to shield the activities of the parent and its
employees from regulatory scrutiny under the Advisers Act
166. Arthur Anderson & Co., 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 617 at n. 16. AA, in
support of its request also noted that the SEC staff :
... at least with respect to a foreign parent, has indicated that it would
not require the registration of the parent if: (i) the affiliate was
organized as a separate legal entity, (ii) the affiliate is staffed with
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CONCLUSION

To perform either of the regulated activities brokerage or
investment advisory services, described above, the choice is register or be subject to the supervision and control of the registered
entity. And, registration under one Act, the 1934 Act or Advisers
Act, does not obviate the need to register under the other Act.
Registration is specific to the function. Accordingly, broker-dealers are not required to register as investment advisers unless such
broker-dealers also engage in other than incidental investment
advisory activities. 1 7 Similarly, persons engaged as investment
personnel capable of providing investment advice, (iii) personnel
providing investment advice and their supervisors are "associated
persons of the affiliate and subject to its supervision, and (iv) the
Commission is given access to the books and records of the affiliate and
its personnel. Division of Investment Management, Securities and
Exchange Commission, Protecting Investors: A Half Century of
Investment Company Regulation 233-234 (May 1992). Although the
staff has not indicated that it is prepared to apply such conditions to
domestic entities, and, accordingly, we have not specifically discussed
the application of such conditions to Arthur Andersen's proposal, we
believe that Arthur Andersen's proposal would satisfy these conditions.
Id. at 34 n. 16.
167. As noted previously, pursuant to Section 202(a)(11)(c) of the Advisers Act,
certain activities of broker-dealers will not trigger registration under the
Advisers Act. Broker-dealers may only engage in "incidental" investment
advisory activities for which no "special compensation" is charged without
registering as an investment adviser. In explaining the foregoing, the SEC
stated that:
Clause (C) of section 202(a)(11) [of the Advisors Act] amounts to a
recognition that brokers and dealers commonly give a certain amount of
advice to their customers in the course of their regular business, and
that it would be inappropriate to bring them within the scope of the
Investment Advisers Act merely because of this aspect of their business.
On the other hand, that portion of clause (C) which refers to special
compensation amounts to an equally clear recognition that a broker or
dealer who is specially compensated for the rendition of advice should be
considered an investment adviser and not be excluded from the purview
of the Act merely because he is also engaged in effecting market
transaction in securities. It is well known that may brokers and dealers
have investment advisory departments which furnish investment does
an investment adviser who operates solely in an advisory capacity. The
essential distinction to be borne in mind in considering borderline cases,
such as those which you have presented, is the distinction between
compensation for advise itself and compensation for services of another
character to which advice is merely incidental.
1940 SEC LEXIS 1466 (Oct. 28, 1940).
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advisers, but not effecting securities transactions or buying and
selling are not required to register as broker-dealers. Investment
advisory and brokerage service differ in character 168 and are subject to distinct regulatory schemes. Given the foregoing, how can
a broker-dealer who itself is not also an RIA, statutorily or by
experience, exercise supervision and control over an RIA or a broker-dealer SRO established under the 1934 Act assert jurisdiction
over the Advisers Act investment advisory activities of an RIA,
even if owned and operated by its members' registered
representatives?
If separately registered, how can such an RIA, even if both an
RR and RIA, be simultaneously under the control of the brokerdealer with respect to investment advisory services performed on
behalf of the RIA? Should not the present regulatory insistence on
broker-dealer supervision and control over RR/RIA arrangements
shift to insistence upon separateness and independence? Will not
separateness and independence between the functions of RR and
RIA be sufficient to effect the dictates of the shibboleth and conform to the mandate of Section 208(d)? Indeed, without such separateness and independence between the RR's broker-dealer and
his RIA, could it not be viewed that the broker-dealer, not registered under the Advisers Act, was doing indirectly that which it
could not do directly; namely, providing investment advisory services, using the RR/RIA merely as a conduit, in violation of Section
208(d) of the shibboleth?' 69
If the investment advisory activities of a registered representative are subject to the control of a separately incorporated RIA
or, if conducted by the registered representative, as an RIA pursuant to the Advisers Act, no additional supervision and control is
required. Sole RIA control over the investment advisory activities
conducted on its behalf and in its name should be uniformly
demanded. No further or less RIA control should be tolerated.
This is precisely the call of the regulatory shibboleth repeated by
the SEC staff'7 and the mandate of Section 208(d) of the Advisers
Act.
168. The staff stated that a broker-dealer parent was not required to register
under the Advisers Act notwithstanding its contemplated establishment of an
investment advisory subsidiary since the services provided by each differ in
character. F.S. Mosely & Co., 70-71 CCH, Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. 78,063.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 208(d).
170. The Commission and its staff have on numerous occasions confirmed the
view that "a person associated with an investment adviser" as that term is
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A registered investment adviser does not have the expertise
to supervise and control a registered broker-dealer nor does a registered broker-dealer have the expertise to supervise and control a
separately registered investment adviser. The SEC should not ex
cathedraimpose supplementary oversight on some advisory activities. The conduct of investment advisory activities by all RIAs
should be subject to the same oversight, not heightened scrutiny
for RR/RIAs and lesser scrutiny for other RIAs.
The present regulatory focus in RIA networking arrangements once the shibboleth has been satisfied, should shift to disclosure and anti-fraud concerns.
The regulatory waters need not be muddied. The regulation
should not be uneven. The shibboleth of register or be an associated person subject to control of the registered entity should be
consistently applied. The required degrees of RIA control should
not vary depending upon whether the arrangement is with a
financial institution, or broker-dealer or other entity. Section
208(d) should be consistently applied. Regulatory insistence in
RIA dual or networking arrangements should shift from imposing
broker-dealer supervision and control in the RR/RIA arrangements; and imposing various degrees of RIA control depending
upon the networking partner, to insistence on independence and
separateness as well as disclosure and anti-fraud concerns.

defined in Section 202(a)(17)[of the Advisers Act], will not be required to be
separately registered as an investment adviser with respect to the activities
undertaken on behalf of the adviser in the person's capacity as an associated
person. Ropes & Gray,1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS at 26 (Sept. 26, 1995).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997

61

